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The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication:
An Assessment and a Different Perspective
ROBERT A. SEDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
For some time now I have been following the legitimacy debate-
whether in constitutional adjudication it is legitimate for the Supreme Court to
engage in what has been called noninterpretive review -as an interested, but
somewhat detached, observer. My approach to constitutional law, both as a
teacher and as a commentator, has been primarily to analyze the Court's
institutional behavior, focusing on the results that the Court reaches in prac-
tice and on the relationship between those results and the Court's articulated
doctrine_ I am not particularly comfortable in dealing with constitutional
theory, particularly when it becomes rarefied and enters the realm of philos-
ophy and jurisprudence. Consequently, except for ongoing informal discus-
sions with my colleague, Professor Joseph Grano, I have heretofore stayed
out of the debate.
What has intrigued me the most about the debate, however, is its utterly
academic nature. The Supreme Court has expressed no apparent interest in
the debate, even while it continues to be sharply divided not only over the
results in particular cases, but also over how interventionist a stance the
Court should take * That ostensible disinterest on the part of the Court, in
what Professor Michael Perry calls the "central problem of contemporary
constitutional theory,"4 appears to be quite significant to one like me, for
whom the focal point of analysis is the Court's institutional behavior. Why is
the Court apparently so disinterested? Why does the Court not share the
concern of the academic theorists about the legitimacy of what it is doing,
particularly when it is so divided over the extent to which it should invalidate
governmental action as being prohibited by the Constitution?
Perhaps the explanation for the Court's seeming indifference to the
legitimacy debate is that the Court resolved the legitimacy question long ago,
and that as an institution it has had no doubt about the framework within
which it should proceed in constitutional adjudication. I have strongly sus-
• Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1956, J.D. 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
I. In the broad sense, noninterpretive review means that in the resolution of constitutional questions the
judiciary may go beyond the values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers. See infra subpart II(C).
2. The Court's institutional behavior evolves over a period of time. and it is not always consistent with the
Court's articulated doctrine. The law of the Constitution is a reflection of the interaction between the Court's
articulated doctrine and the results that the Court reaches in applying that doctrine. The behavior of the Court as
an institution, of course, is distinct from the behavior of the individual Justices, i.e., how they would decide
individual cases. In simple terms, the Court's institutional behavior refers to what the Court does in the process
of constitutional adjudication.
3. See infra notes 109-27 and accompanying text.
4. \. PERRY. THE CONSTITUTION. THE COURTS. AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
PERRN I.
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pected that this is the reason the Court has treated the academic debate over
legitimacy with apparent indifference. At the same time, I have believed that
the Court's own view about the legitimacy of what it has been doing and about
the nature of its function in constitutional adjudication might provide some
insights into the academic debate.
I have been thinking about doing this kind of institutional analysis for
some time. The publication of Professor Perry's excellent book" setting forth
his justification for noninterpretive review, and the publication of Professor
Grano's major work 6 setting forth his arguments concerning the illegitimacy
of noninterpretive review, finally motivated me to act. The coincidence of the
publication of these works by my two good friends, setting forth diametrically
opposite viewpoints, furnished the appropriate occasion for me to enter the
controversy and to see whether I could support my skepticism about the
relevance of the academic debate. To gain a basic understanding of the
debate, I read most of the major writings in the area. This task caused me
some trepidation, but in light of my approach it is probably not of great
moment whether I fully appreciate all the nuances and variations in the works
of the theorists.7 I think that I understand the basic controversy and the
general differences of viewpoint well enough for my present purposes.
I begin by discussing the legitimacy debate and how it relates to the
purported tensions between judicial review and representative democracy. I
then discuss the differing positions on the question of legitimacy: the inter-
pretivist and noninterpretivist positions, and some of the variations within
each. I conclude that the debate cannot be objectively resolved because both
viewpoints proceed on totally different underlying premises. In the next sec-
tion of the Article I discuss the institutional behavior of the Supreme Court in
constitutional adjudication and show why the Court has never doubted that
noninterpretive judicial review is an integral part of the Court's performance
of its constitutional function. Finally, I try to provide a different perspective
on the legitimacy question and to demonstrate that noninterpretive review is
not only legitimate, but is also a necessary postulate of constitutional adjudica-
tion under our constitutional scheme. Therefore, I conclude not only that the
current legitimacy debate is completely academic, but also that it is quite
properly treated by the Court as irrelevant in the process of constitutional
adjudication.
5. PERRY. supra note 4.
6. Grano. Judiciel Review and t Written Constitution in a Democratik Society. 28 WAYNE L. REV. I
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Grano].
7. The literature is now quite vast. Some works that I have read I do not discuss in this Article. Some
works I did not read. But I am satisfied that I have read the major writings in this area and have a fairly good
understanding of the nature of the legitimacy debate.
[Vol. 44:93
THE LEGITIMACY DEBATE
II. THE LEGITIMACY DEBATE: AN ANALYSIS AND AN ASSESSMENT
A. The Framework of the Debate: The Purported Tension Between Non-
interpretive Review and Representative Democracy
Perry says that the legitimacy of noninterpretive review is the "central
and most difficult problem of contemporary constitutional theory."8 Non-
interpretive review, he says, involves the Court in "constitutional policy-
making" because the Court goes beyond "'value judgments" made by the
framers* According to Perry and other theorists, constitutional policy mak-
ing by the judiciary aggravates the tension purportedly inherent in any judicial
review. Whenever the Court engages in judicial review, it invalidates the
policy choices of the electorally accountable branches of the federal and state
governments, 0 and the tension between judicial review and representative
democracy is aggravated when the invalidation is not based on values consti-
tutionalized, or value judgments made. by the framers.
Perry fairly explains the interpretivist position on the illegitimacy of
constitutional policy making by the judiciary. Governmental decisions deter-
mining which competing values should prevail should be subject to control by
persons accountable, directly or indirectly, to the electorate. Constitutional
constraints on electorally accountable policy making consist of value judg-
ments constitutionalized by the framers. It is not legitimate for the federal
judiciary, which is not electorally accountable, "to engage in constitutional
policyinaking ... as opposed to constitutional interpretation.'"' The only
legitimate function of the judiciary regarding policy making is to keep it within
constitutional bounds, and the judiciary must do so with "reference to value
judgments constitutionalized by the framers. "' 2
Grano argues that noninterpretive review is inconsistent with democratic
self-government and that the Constitution furnishes no authority for "the
judiciary to constitutionalize moral values not fairly inferable from the doc-
ument itself." 3 He maintains that while "considerable evidence exists that
the framers expected the judiciary to declare legislation unconstitutional,
' 1 4
it cannot be demonstrated that the framers intended the judiciary to have the
broad authority to invalidate legislation by invoking nonpositivistic moral
8. PERRY. supra note 4. at 6.
9. Id. at 11.20.
I0. Id. at 9. Fora discussion whether the legitimacy of striking downstate legislation should be determined
apart from the legitimacy of striking down federal legislation, see id. at 35-36.
II. Id. at 28-29.
12. Id. at 29.
13. Grano. supra note 6, at 8.
14. Id. at 15. In support of this proposition. Grano cites C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 22-25
(1960), and A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 15 (1962). For a discussion of whether the framers
intended the courts to exercise judicial review, see PERRY, supra note 4, at 14-17, and the works cited on those
pages.
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principles." He notes, in this regard, that in Marbiny v. Madison the Court
engaged only in interpretive review because "the judgment could be rendered
with reference to the text, history, and structure of article III. "' 7
Judge Robert Bork, another exponent of the interpretivist position, re-
lates interpretive review (the only legitimate mode of review) to the matter of
majority and minority freedom. The Madison model, says Bork, has both a
majoritarian and a countermajoritarian premise. In most areas of life, major-
ities are entitled to rule for no better reason than that they are majorities, but
some areas of life a majority should not control. The dilemma is resolved both
in constitutional theory and in popular understanding by the Supreme Court's
power to define both majority and minority freedom through the interpre-
18tation of the Constitution. It follows, therefore, according to Bork, "that the
Court's power is legitimate only if it has, and can demonstrate in reasoned
opinions that it has, a valid theory, derived from the Constitution. of the
respective spheres of majority and minority freedom."' 9 Thus, once the
Court goes outside the Constitution and engages in what Perry calls constitu-
tional policy making, Bork would say that the Court is acting illegitimately
because it is not relying on the Constitution to define the spheres of majority
and minority power.
Dean John Hart Ely, in his now classic work on constitutional theory?2"
fully explores the purported tensions between noninterpretive review and
representative democracy. According to Ely, "the usual brand of noninter-
pretivism, with its appeal to some notion to be found neither in the Constitu-
tion nor, obviously, in the judgment of the political branches, seems especial-
ly vulnerable to a charge of inconsistency with democratic theory."' In
addition, he says that the "tricky task has been and remains that of devising a
way of protecting minorities from majority tyranny that is not a flagrant
contradiction of the principle of majority rule .... ," The point of difference
between the interpretive and the noninterpretive positions highlights this
problem: "The noninterpretivist would have politically unaccountable judges
select and define the values to be placed beyond majority control," while the
interpretivist would take those values from only the Constitution itself.
"?
It is fair to say, therefore, that the legitimacy debate has proceeded on the
assumption that the legitimacy question arises from an inherent tension between
judicial review and representative democracy, which is aggravated when the
15. Grano. supra note 6. at 16-17.
16. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. Grano. supra note 6. at II.
18. Bork. Veutral Principles and Some First Amendmnent Problems. 47 IND. L.J. I. 2-3 (19711.
19. li. at 3.
20. J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
21. Id. at 5.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. By the phrase "values taken from the Constitution itself.- the interpretivist, refer to 'alueN
purportedly constitutionalized by the framers. See inJra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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Court engages in noninterpretive review. This aggravation results because, in
that circumstance, the basis of the Court's invalidation of electorally account-
able policy making is not values constitutionalized, and value judgments made,
by the framers. The interpretivists maintain that the Court cannot legitimately go
beyond those values and value judgments in constitutional adjudication, while
the noninterpretivists maintain that either generally, or at least for certain
purposes, the Court may infuse values into the Constitution that were not
demonstrably constitutionalized by the framers and may invalidate electorally
accountable policy making that it finds inconsistent with those judicially in-
fused values.
This Article will demonstrate, in discussing the structure of governance
established by the Constitution, that the purported tension between repre-
sentative democracy and noninterpretive review is illusory. As a result, the
underlying assumption of the legitimacy debate is completely erroneous, and
the framework within which the debate has proceeded is analytically un-
sound. Thus, the validity of the debate itself is most dubious.
B. The Interpretivist Position
The essence of the interpretivist position is that judicial review is legit-
imate only if the invalidation of electorally accountable policy making relates
to the intention of the framers and to values constitutionalized by the framers.
Variations do exist in the interpretivist position, but only in terms of the
degree of deference afforded the intention of the framers. At one end of the
interpretivist spectrum is the view of Raoul Berger, who maintains that all
constitutional questions must be resolved by referring to the specific inten-
tions of the framers and that the only practices the Court can legitimately
declare to be unconstitutional are those that the framers specifically intended
to ban by adopting a particular constitutional provision and those that are
analogues to practices that the framers specifically intended to ban.-24 Berger
contends, for example, that the framers of the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause intended to prohibit racial discrimination only in the exer-
cise of certain rights, of which education was not one.25 Consequently, the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education26 was not con-
sistent with the intention of the framers and, therefore, was not a legitimate
exercise of judicial review. 27 Thus, Berger's view of interpretivism is one of
24. See generally R. BERGER. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 133. 191-92. 249-50 (1977).
25. Id. at 18-36. 133. 169. 176. 191. "'[T~he framers employed *equal protection of the law' to express their
limited purpose: to secure the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act. and those only. against diserininatory
State legish1tion.'" Id. at 133 (emphasis in original).
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. For an incisive criticism of Berger's interpretation of the preadoption history of the fourteenth amend-
ment. see Dimond. Strict Construction and Judicial Review of Racial Discriniation Under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretirist Grounds. 80 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1982). Professor Dimond
insists that the preadoption history demonstrates that the fourteenth amendment (particularly the equal protec-
tion clause) was -framed in general terms and did not have a generally accepted and narrowly limited meaning."
Id. at 502,
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original understanding in a very exact sense, or what Professor Paul Brest
calls "strict originalism.
' s
At the other end of the interpretivist spectrum is Professor Grano's view,
which looks to the broader intention of the framers and to the values that the
framers intended to constitutionalize. Grano maintains that the Constitution
should not be read to authorize a methodology of judicial review that would
permit the federal judiciary to constitutionalize moral values or principles of
justice "not fairly inferable from the document itself."-29 He says that the
framers did not intend the judiciary to have the broad authority to invalidate
legislation by invoking "nonpositivistic moral principles." 3 Thus, the only
values on which the Court can rely to invalidate electorally accountable
policy making are those that have been constitutionalized by the framers. 3'
Although Grano refers to the written Constitution's "text or struc-
ture," 32 it is clear that his view of interpretivism looks to the intention of the
framers and to the values that they intended to constitutionalize rather than to
the text of the Constitution itself.3 3 For example, Grano argues that although
the text of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause says that no
state shall "deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws,"3 the
framers intended to proscribe only discrimination based on race or national
origin35 and, therefore, to constitutionalize only the value of racial equality.
36
According to Grano, under interpretivist review "the Court gives meaning to
frequently nondiscrete, nonspecific value judgments that the framers wrote
into the Constitution"; 37 under noninterpretivist review, in contrast, "the
Court's source of judgment is completely extra-constitutional." 38
Apart from limiting judicial review to values constitutionalized by the
framers, Grano's view of interpretivism does not make the Court's resolution
of contemporary constitutional questions depend on the specific intentions or
28. Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 222-23 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Brest].
29. Grano, sapra note 6, at 8.
30. Id. at 16.
31. Id. at 64.
32. Id.
33. For a discussion of the difference between textualism and intentionalism. see Brest, stpra note 28. at
205-17. 222-23.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1.
35. Grano makes this point in the context of broadening the scope of the equal protection clause in the area
of racial discrimination beyond the specific intentions of the framers. He says that a strong argument can be
made that the framers saw the fourteenth amendment as protecting "'blacks from state discrimination that
relegated them to an inferior status.- so that the Brown decision is legitimate "even if... the framers assumed
the fourteenth amendment would not apply to segregated schools." Grano. supra note 6. at 70-71. That
interpretation of the equal protection clause is permissible. says Grano. because the framers constitutionalized
the value of racial equality. Id.
36. Although Grano does not specifically discuss this point, it follows from his analysis that the framers did
not intend to constitutionalize any other equality value. He would have to say. therefore, consistent with his
analysis of legitimacy, that it is not legitimate for the Court to rely on the equal protection clause to invalidate
any form of discrimination other than that on the basis of race or ethnic origin.
37. Grano. supra note 6. at 64.
38. Id. By this he means that it is based on values that were not constitutionalized by the framers.
[Vol. 44:93
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the original understanding of the framers. He states: "Interpretivism cannot
be narrow in scope because this would defeat the framers' purpose of trying to
govern the future through broad, general proscriptions; interpretivism cannot
be narrow precisely because constitutional provisions are rarely narrow or
specific in definition." 39 As long as the Court stays within the perimeters of
the values constitutionalized by the framers, then, it is not limited by the
framers' original understanding of the practices that would be invalidated
under a particular constitutional provision. 40 Thus, Grano not only maintains
that the Court acted legitimately in deciding Brown as it did,4' but he would
also permit the Court to define the value of racial equality by referring to
contemporary notions of what racial equality should mean. He would not say
that the Court acted illegitimately in Loving v. Virginia42 when it looked to the
broad, organic purpose of the fourteenth amendment to invalidate a state
antimiscegenation law without considering whether the framers of the
Amendment intended to prohibit this practice. 43 Also, it was not improper for
the Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke44 to apply the
same level of scrutiny to laws that discriminated against whites in favor of
blacks as it did to laws that discriminated against blacks in favor of whites. 45
Since the framers of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause
intended to constitutionalize only the value of racial equality, however, Grano
would have to say, consistent with his analysis of legitimacy, that the Court
cannot properly rely on the equal protection clause to invalidate other clas-
sifications based on identifiable group membership, such as alienage, illegit-
imacy, or gender, or to strike down certain discriminations based on poverty,
or to invalidate general classifications on rational basis or fundamental rights
grounds.46 Similarly, since he maintains that the framers constitutionalized
39. Id.
40. He illustrates this point with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in which the Court held that
governmental wiretapping constitutes a fourth amendment search, and with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975). in which the Court interpreted the sixth amendment to invalidate a state law that had the effect of
systematically excluding women from jury service. Even though the framers may not have specifically intended
to ban eavesdropping, which is analogous to wiretapping, and even though they may not have contemplated that
women would sit on juries, the Court's holdings in those cases. Grano says. were based on values constitu-
tionalized by the framers and not on -values derived from external sources.- Grano. supra note 6. at 65-75.
41. Grano. supra note 6. at 70-73.
42. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. The Court in Loving took the position, as it did in Brown, that the historical sources were inconclusive.
Id. at 9. In Loving, however, the Court downplayed the significance of historical sources generally, because it
looked to the broad, organic purpose of the fourteenth amendment rather than to the specific intent of the
framers to proscribe particular practices. Regardless of whether the framers specifically intended to ban anti-
miscegenation laws, the Court held that such laws were unconstitutional because they were inconsistent with
the broad, organic purpose of the fourteenth amendment "to eliminate all official state sources of invidious
racial discrimination in the States." Id.
44. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
45. Justice Powell observed in Bakke: "'It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all
persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded
others." Id. at 295 (emphasis in original). For Grano's view on the proper approach to the constitutionality of
the racial preference considered in BakAe. see Grano. Book Review. 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1395. 1401-11 (1980)
(reviewing A. SINDLER. BAKKE. DEFUNIS AND MINORITY ADMISSIONS (1978)).
46. See s pra note 36.
1983]
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only "process" values into the due process clause, the Court's imputation of
a substantive meaning to due process, from Lochner v. New York47 to Roe v.
Wade, 48 was necessarily illegitimate. 49 As Grano emphasizes, nothing in his
more expansive view of interpretivism "supports the far different viewpoint
that the judiciary should be able to constitutionalize values not inferable from
the Constitution itself."50
Because the variations in the interpretivist position arise only from dif-
ferences in the degree of deference due the intention of the framers, and
because Grano's view is the most expansive in this regard, this Article uses
his view as the reference point in its analysis of the interpretivist position.
That interpretivist view is described by Professor Brest as "moderate orig-
inalism." 5' Brest maintains that while "strict originalism" is not a "tenable
approach to constitutional decisionmaking,- 5 2 "moderate originalism" is
"coherent and workable." 53 Brest also says that the only difference between
moderate originalism and nonoriginalist adjudication-noninterpretive
review-is one of attitude toward the text and original understanding. For the
moderate originalist these sources are conclusive, at least when they speak
clearly. For the nonoriginalist the text and original understanding are only
presumptively binding; neither is a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
constitutional decision making.54 Brest also demonstrates, however, that this
different attitude toward the text and original understanding produces
markedly different results in constitutional adjudication.55
To sum up, the focal point of moderate originalism as developed by
Grano-his more expansive view of interpretivism-is the values that the
framers intended to constitutionalize. Those values, Grano says, can be
determined from the historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of the
constitutional provisions.5 6 When the Court infuses values into the Constitu-
tion that were not constitutionalized by the framers and relies on those values
47. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
48. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
49. Grano states that there is no "objective source [in the Constitution] for defining fundamental rights."
Grano. supra note 6. at 28.
50 Ii. at 64. Again. when Grano uses the phrase "values not inferable from the Constitution itself" he is
referring to values not constitutionalized by the framers. The text of the fourteenth amendment, for example.
can be said to infer the very broad value of equality. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
51. Brest, supra note 28, at 205, 223-24. It is moderate originalism of the intentionalist rather than the
textualist variety.
52. Id. at 205-22, 229-31. See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-42 (1980).
53. Brest. supra note 28. at 205.
54. Id. at 229-37.
55. Id. at 223-24.
56. For our present purposes we may assume that it is possible to ascertain from the preadoption history of
a particular constitutional provision what values the framers purportedly constitutionalized into that provision.
As this Article will demonstrate, however, it is quite doubtful whether the framers actually intended to constitu-
tionalize values when they were drafting constitutional provisions. For a discussion of the difficulty of deter-
mining the intentions of the framers generally. see Brest. supra note 28. at 214-22. Brest concludes:
The interpreter's understanding of the original understanding may be so indeterminate as to undermine
the rationale for originalism. Although the origins of some constitutional doctrines are almost certainly
established, the historical grounding of many others is quite controversial. It seems peculiar, to sa, the
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to invalidate actions of the electorally accountable branches, Grano contends,
the Court is acting in an illegitimate manner and is not properly performing the
judicial function authorized by article III.
C. The Noninterpretivist Position
The essence of the noninterpretivist position is that in constitutional
adjudication the Court may legitimately go beyond values constitutionalized
by the framers and rely on judicially infused values to invalidate electorally
accountable policy making. Brest maintains: "[T]he aims of constitutionalism
are best served by nonoriginalist adjudication which treats the text and orig-
inal history as important but not necessarily authoritative."-
57
While substantially more variations exist in the noninterpretivist position
than in the interpretivist, 53 the different views of noninterpretivism can be
categorized according to two justifications. One is the functional justification:
noninterpretivist review is justifiable because it serves a very important func-
tion in our constitutional system and in society as a whole. The other may be
termed the consistency justification: noninterpretivist review is consistent
with the general intention of the framers in promulgating the Constitution and
in adopting its particular provisions.
Professor Perry and Professor Brest are two of the principal proponents
of the functional justification. Perry contends:
There is ... no way to avoid the conclusion that noninterpretive review, whether
of state or federal action, cannot be justified by reference either to the text or the
intentions of the framers .... The justification for the practice, if there is one,
must be functional: If noninterpretive review serves a crucial governmental func-
tion that no other practice realistically can be expected to serve, and if it serves
that function in a manner that somehow accommodates the principle of electorally
accountable policymaking, then that function constitutes the justification for non-
interpretive review.59
Perry finds this functional justification in the need for the protection of
fundamental human rights by an institution that is capable of discovering "the
right answers ... to fundamental political-moral problems." 60 He maintains
that "[o]ver time, the practice of noninterpretive review has evolved as a way
of remedying what would otherwise be a serious defect in American govern-
least, that the legitimacy of current doctrine should turn on the historian's judgment that it seems
"more likely than not." or even "rather likely." that the adopters intended it some one or two
centuries ago.
Id. at 222 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 228. When Brest refers to the "text" of the Constitution, he is referring to the textualist mode of
constitutional analysis. Textualism emphasizes the language of a provision as the framers understood it at the
time of promulgation.
58. PERRY. supra note 4. at 24. It should not be surprising that a number of commentators have made a
very strong effort to justify noninterpretive review, since those commentators agree that many of the Court's
important decisions in the area of individual rights can be supported only on that basis.
59. PERRY. supra note 4. at 24.
60. Id. at 102.
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ment-the absence of any policymaking institution that regularly deals with
fundamental political-moral problems other than by mechanical reference to
established moral conventions."' - He thus concludes:
My essential claim, then, is that noninterpretive review in human rights cases
enables us to take seriously-indeed is a way of taking seriously-the possibility
that there are right answers to political-moral problems. As a matter of compar-
ative institutional competence, the politically insulated federal judiciary is more
likely, when the human rights issue is a deeply controversial one, to move us in the
direction of a right answer (assuming there is such a thing) than is the political
process left to its own devices, which tends to resolve such issues by reflective,
mechanical reference to established moral conventions. 
62
For the Court to perform this crucial function in American society, Perry
contends that it cannot be limited to values constitutionalized by the framers
or to the original understanding of the Constitution, but, instead, must make
independent value choices and look to "determinative norms [that]...
derive from the judge's own moral vision."' 63
Professor Brest argues that noninterpretivist review is functionally just-
ified because, more than any other tenable mode of review (such as moderate
originalism), it "contribute[s] to the well-being of our society-or, more nar-
rowly, to the ends of constitutional government." ' He says that to determine
whether one mode of review is preferable to another, that mode should "(1)
foster democratic government; (2) protect individuals against arbitrary, unfair
and intrusive official action; (3) conduce to a political order that is relatively
stable but which also responds to changing conditions, values and needs; (4)
not readily lend itself to arbitrary decisions or abuses; and (5) be acceptable to
the populace." 65 He then attempts to demonstrate that noninterpretivist re-
view serves these ends better than interpretivist review 66 and concludes: "To
put it bluntly, one can better protect fundamental values and the integrity of
democratic processes by protecting them than by guessing how other people
meant to govern a different society a hundred or more years ago." 67
Dean John Hart Ely, while expressing serious reservations about the
61. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 102.
63. Id. at 123. Perry also maintains that we need not fear that the exercise of noninterpretive review will be
inconsistent with representative democracy. because the judiciary is subject to significant political controls, the
most important of which is the power of Congress to "define. and, therefore, to limit, the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court and the original and appellate jurisdiction of the lower federal courts." Id. at 128.
64. Brest. supra note 28. at 226.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 228-34.
67. Id. at 238. Brest refers to his view of noninterpretive review as fundamental rights adjudication and has
launched a strong attack on the critics of this view. He maintains that none of the critics' own theories can
withstand the force of their criticisms: all of the theories "are vulnerable to similar criticisms based on their
indeterminacy, manipulability, and, ultimately, their reliance on judicial value choices that cannot be 'objec-
tively" derived from text. history. consensus, natural rights, or any other source." Brest. The Fundamnental
Rights Contro'ersy': The Essential Contradictions oJ .Vorinatihe Constitutional Scholarship. 90 YALE L.J. 1063.
1096 (1981).
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legitimacy of noninterpretive review generally, 6* proffers a functional justifi-
cation for such review in certain areas. Noninterpretive review generally is of
doubtful legitimacy, says Ely, because it "would have politically unaccount-
able judges select and define the values to be placed beyond majority con-
trol," permitting them to revise policy choices made by the electorally ac-
countable branches of the government. 69 But when noninterpretive review
would enhance the democratic process, that is, when it is participation ori-
ented and representation reinforcing, then Ely contends that it can be func-
tionally justified. 70 Ely maintains that the structure of the Constitution is
process oriented 7' and that it therefore justifies a participation-oriented and
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review. He further contends
that the judiciary is the proper agency to implement the participation-oriented
and representation-reinforcing values:
[A] representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, unlike its rival value-
protecting approach, is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary (and quite by
design) entirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the American system of
representative democracy .... [S]uch an approach, again in contradistinction to
its rival, involves tasks that courts, as experts on process and (more important) as
political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better qualified and situated to perform
than political officials. 72
Under Ely's limited view of noninterpretive review, the federal judiciary can
legitimately engage in noninterpretive review to police the process of repre-
sentation, as in the reapportionment cases; 73 to clear the channels of political
change, as in the voting rights cases and the first amendment area; 74 and to
facilitate the representation of minorities, as in the equal protection cases in
which the Court invalidates racial or gender discrimination and other dis-
crimination based on identifiable group membership. 75 Predictably, Ely's
compromise position and his limited view of noninterpretive review have
68. See generally J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 43-72 (1980). Ely maintains that it is impossible to
discover what have been called fundamental values in any of the sources relied on by proponents of fundamental
rights adjudication. Thus. judges necessarily fall back on their own values in deciding what limitations the
broadly phrased and open-ended provisions of the Constitution will impose. He notes: "If a principled approach
to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended provisions cannot be developed, one that is not
hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to representative democracy. responsible commentators
must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply should stay away from them. Id. at 41. See infra note
136.
69. J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7-8 (1980).
70. Id. at 101-04.
71. Id. at 88-101. For strong disagreement with Ely's view on the process-oriented nature of the Constitu-
tion. see Tribe. The PtzJzing Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories. 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
Tribe notes: "One difficulty that immediately confronts process theories is the stubbornly substantive character
of so many of the Constitution's most crucial commitments: commitments defining the values that we as a
society, acting politically, must respect." Id. at 1065. Tribe also maintains that the participation-oriented and
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review that Ely advocates "requires a theory of values and rights
as plainly substantive as. and seemingly of a piece with. the theories of values and rights that underlie the
Constitution's provisions addressing religion, slavery, and property." Id. at 1069.
72. J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88 (1980).
73. See id. at 73-104.
74. See id. at 105-34.
75. See id. at 135-80.
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come under strong attack from both the interpretivists and the noninterpre-
tivists, who agree that the distinction he makes between process-oriented
review and value-oriented review is untenable. The interpretivist critics say
that the arguments he makes against noninterpretivist review generally apply
equally to noninterpretivist review designed to achieve both participation-
oriented and representation-reinforcing objectives, 76 while the noninterpre-
tivist critics say that the arguments Ely makes in favor of his limited version
of noninterpretivism undercut the arguments he makes against noninterpre-
tivist review generally.77
The other category of justification is the consistency justification. Here
noninterpretivist review is considered to be consistent with, or at least not
inconsistent with, the general intention of the framers in promulgating the
Constitution and in adopting its particular provisions. Professor Thomas Grey
maintains that an unwritten constitution exists in addition to the written
Constitution. 78 He says that "in the framing of the original American Con-
stitutions it was widely accepted that there remained unwritten but still bind-
ing principles of higher law. The ninth amendment is the textual expression of
this idea in the federal Constitution. '- 79 He then says that "[a]s it came to be
accepted that the judiciary had the power to enforce the commands of the
written Constitution when these conflicted with ordinary law, it was also
widely assumed that judges would enforce as constitutional restraints the
unwritten natural rights as well." '80 Grey further contends that a natural rights
constitutional theory "was the formative theory underlying [section
one] ... of the fourteenth amendment"; accordingly, the fourteenth amend-
ment "is ... properly seen as a reaffirmation and reenactment in positive law
of the principle that fundamental human rights have constitutional status." 8'
Therefore, he concludes:
[T]here was an original understanding, both implicit and textually expressed, that
unwritten higher law principles had constitutional status. From the very begin-
ning, and continuously until the Civil War, the courts acted on that understanding
and defined and enforced such principles as part of their function of judicial
review. Aware of that history, the framers of the 14th amendment reconfirmed the
original understanding through the "majestic generalities" of section 1. And ever
since, again without significant break, the courts have openly proclaimed and
enforced unwritten constitutional principles. 
82
76. See. e.g.. Grano. Ely's Theory oJitdicial Review: Preserving the Significance oJ the Political Process.
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 167 (1981). Grano. nonetheless, maintains that Ely has made a very important contribution to
constitutional theory by setting forth the "view that the political arena is generally the place to settle issues of
policy and morality." Id. at 184.
77. See. e.g.. Tribe. The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories. 89 YALE LJ.
1063 (1980): Brest. The Substance oi Process. 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131 (1981). Brest concludes: "[lin his heroic
attempt to establish a value-free mode of constitutional adjudication. John Hart Ely has come as close as anyone
could to proving it can't be done." Id. at 142.
78. Grey. Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?. 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
79. Id. at 716.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 717.
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Consequently, under Grey's view of original understanding 3 noninterpretive
review is legitimate because it is fully consistent with the intention of the
framers that the Constitution embody both unwritten higher law principles
and the textual limitations on governmental power.
Dean Terrance Sandalow, in a particularly valuable work on constitu-
tional interpretation, 84 concentrates primarily on describing how the Supreme
Court has defined the meaning of the Constitution in light of changing circum-
stances and changing values. Simultaneously, however, he has in effect pro-
vided a justification for noninterpretive review. Sandalow notes that con-
stitutional decision making "has not been confined to a process of discover-
ing the specific intentions of the framers." 85 That our Constitution is intended
to endure provides the most persuasive reason that constitutional decision
making cannot be based on the specific intentions of the framers, since "the
questions for which subsequent generations have sought answers in the
Constitution have been the questions of those generations.
' 86
Sandalow, in effect, finds a justification for noninterpretive review in the
general intention of the framers, most particularly their intention that the
Constitution was meant to be an enduring document. Accordingly, the mean-
ing of particular constitutional provisions may properly change from one
generation to another. 87 He observes:
The insight that intentions can be understood in general terms has played an
important role in the development of constitutional law, for it has provided a
means by which to mediate between the belief that the meaning of the Constitution
ought to be found in the intentions of the framers and the need to accommodate
the Constitution to changing circumstances and values.
88
Since the focus is on the general intention of the framers, Sandalow
maintains that the Court has acted properly in not limiting the framework of
constitutional decision making to values constitutionalized by the framers.
- [T]he values to which constitutional law gives expression are more nearly
those of the present than those of the past." 89 The equal protection clause, for
example, "'can be understood as proscribing not only certain practices direct-
ed against blacks, with which the draftsmen were immediately concerned, but
also all other practices that arbitrarily distinguish among classes of indi-
viduals." 9 In other words, he views the equal protection clause as embody-
83. Grey has subsequently tried to demonstrate that the Constitution was intended to embody natural law
thinking, but has concluded that further research is necessary before the matter can be definitively resolved.
Grey. Ori ,ins oJ tie Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought. 30 STAN.
L. REV. 843 (1978). In contrast. Perry maintains that "[the historical record simply does not support the
proposition that the Framers constitutionalized natural law.'" Perry. uterpretiism. Freedom oj Espression.
and Equal Protection. 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261. 267 (1981).
84. Sandalow. Constitutional hterpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981).
85. Id. at 1035.
86. Id.
87. For discussion and examples. see id. at 1038-55.
88. Id. at 1036.
89. Id. at 1039.
90. Id. at 1036.
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ing a guarantee of equality of treatment. Thus, consistent with the general
intention of the framers, that clause can be relied on to invalidate all arbitrary
classifications and distinctions. 9'
Sandalow places a great deal of emphasis on the Constitution as a doc-
ument intended to endure and on the need to shape constitutional law to
current values. Constitutional decision making is limited, he argues, but the
limits "are not those imposed by the language and pre-adoption history of the
Constitution. '- 92 They "are those that have developed over time in the on-
going process of valuation that occurs in the name of the Constitution
. * they are the elements of reason that are intrinsic to the process of deter-
mining whether a proposed interpretation truly reflects those values. " 93 He
concludes: "Constitutional law thus emerges not as exegesis, but as a process
by which each generation gives formal expression to the values it holds
fundamental in the operation of government. The intentions of the framers
describe neither its necessary minimal content nor its permissible outer
boundaries." 94
Professors Munzer and Nickel take a similar position by viewing the
Constitution as susceptible of growth. 95 They say that "our constitutional
system is a unique, intricate product of text and institutional practice," 96 that
"authoritative interpretation can modify the meaning of the Constitution, and
that the present content of the document results from the interaction over
time of framers, judges, legislatures, and executive officials," a process that
produces change in "the meaning of the Constitution itself." 97 Thus, the
"Constitution is . . . not merely a written instrument ... but a text-based
institutional practice in which authoritative interpreters can create new con-
stitutional norms." 98 Munzer and Nickel analogize the Constitution to a living
organism that grows.
Growth is a kind of natural, gradual, ordered, predictable change that occurs
within an organism whose identity remains constant. Change of this sort is in
accordance with the nature of the organism; it is provided for in the "program."
To see constitutional change in this way is to put it in a favorable light. It is to see it
as the sort of natural and gradual development that was anticipated by the
framers. 99
91. To ask. in each instance, whether the framers "intended" the specific or the general is to pose a
question that almost invariably is unanswerable. The question assumes that they intended one or the
other, but not both. But the issues did not arise for the framers in a way that forced such a choice: they
could have intended both simultaneously because, viewing them as compatible, they had no reason to
choose between them.
id.
92. Id. at 1054.
93. Id. at 1054-55.
94. Id. at 1068.
95. Munzer & Nickel. Does the Constittion Meaun What It Ali'ai's Meant?. 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029
(1977).
96. Id. at 1030.
97. 1i. at 1042.
98. Id. at 1045.
99. Id. at 1046.
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In summary, under this view noninterpretive review is consistent with the
general intention of the framers because noninterpretive review is necessary
to constitutional growth and because constitutional growth was anticipated by
the framers.
D. The Futility of the Legitimacy Debate
It should be clear by now that the interpretivist and noninterpretivist
views of legitimacy are completely irreconcilable because they proceed on
totally different underlying premises. The noninterpretivist position assumes
that the Constitution is a living document and that its meaning must change to
give expression to the fundamental values of each generation. In this sense
the functional and general intention justifications for noninterpretive review
blend. According to Grey, "Our characteristic contemporary metaphor is 'the
living Constitution'-a constitution with provisions suggesting restraints on
government in the name of basic rights, yet sufficiently unspecific to permit
the judiciary to elucidate the development and change in the content of those
rights over time."'00
Grey recognizes that this view of constitutional adjudication, and of the
Court's role in that process, is "at war with the pure interpretive model."' 0 '
Under the interpretive model "[t]he amendment process was the framers'
chosen and exclusive method of adopting constitutional values to changing
times; the judiciary was to enforce the Constitution's substantive commands
as the framers meant them."' 02 Or, as Grano would say, the judiciary is
authorized under article III to enforce only those values that the framers
constitutionalized, and if other values are to be embodied in the Constitution
it must be done through constitutional amendment. 0 3
The interpretivist position would reject the functional justification for
noninterpretive review on the ground that no matter what functional benefits
may derive from noninterpretive review, that review is simply not authorized
by the Constitution. When the Court engages in noninterpretive review it acts
in a manner that is inconsistent with the judicial function envisaged by the
framers. The interpretivist position would also reject the general intention
justification on the ground that it cannot be supported by historical evidence:
we have no historical evidence that the general intention of the framers was to
permit the judiciary to constitutionalize values that the framers had not con-
stitutionalized and to engage in noninterpretive review. Grano contends that
in a Constitution of enumerated powers the burden is on the proponents of
noninterpretive review '04 to demonstrate that "the framers, who had taken
100. Grey. Do lWe Have an Unwritten Constitution?. 27 STAN. L. REV. 703. 709 (1975).
101. id.
102. Id.
103. Grano. sutpra note 6. at 8. 16-17. 64. Grano believes, however, that we should 'oppose constitutional
amendments that reflect contemporary moral judgments and instead should permit our progeny freedom to
determine their own morality." Id. at 8.
104, l. at 17.
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the extraordinary step of adopting a constitution as a species of positive law.
intended the judiciary to have . . . broad authority" to invalidate legislation
by invoking nonpositivistic moral principles.'0 5 Grano concludes that the
weight of historical evidence does not support this position.'°6
Finally, the interpretivists would reject both the functional and general
intention justification on the ground that noninterpretive review is incon-
sistent with the rationale for judicial review in our constitutional scheme. This
criticism recalls the purported tension between noninterpretive review and
representative democracy. If judicial review can be justified at all, say the
interpretivists, it is because the judiciary is enforcing the limitations that the
Constitution places on electorally accountable policy making. Those limita-
tions reflect values constitutionalized by the framers, and only those values
can properly be relied on to invalidate electorally accountable policy
making. 107
The functional noninterpretivists say that judicial review is justified, de-
spite the purported tension between noninterpretive review and representa-
tive democracy, precisely because of the functional necessity of that kind of
review.' 0 The general intention noninterpretivists are not concerned about
whether specific historical evidence exists to show that the framers intended
the judiciary to exercise noninterpretive review, because they consider that
the exercise of that review is consistent with the general intention of the
framers.
The legitimacy debate then turns out to be futile because each side dis-
putes the underlying premises on which the position of the other side is based.
Since the disputants disagree on the underlying premises of legitimacy, the
debate cannot be objectively resolved, at least according to the terms on
which, thus far, it has proceeded.
The remainder of this Article offers a different perspective on the issue of
legitimacy, a perspective that results primarily from an analysis of the in-
stitutional behavior of the Supreme Court in constitutional adjudication.
105. hi. at 16.
106. Id. The absence of historical evidence indicating that the framers intended to authorize the courts to
undertake noninterpretive review is also conceded by Perry. -'There is no plausible ... historical justification
for constitutional policy making by the judiciary ... PERRY. sttpra note 4. at 24. Likewise. Professor Kent
Greenawalt has contended:
Beyond the obvious fact that the framers often meant to state broad principles rather than precisely
defined legal rules. I am not aware of historical evidence that they adverted to the possibility that later
values would supplant their own or that they regarded it as a positively desirable feature of the
Constitution that their own views about specific practices might be overridden.
Greenawalt. The Enduring Significance oJ Veutral Principles. 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982. 1016 (1978).
107. According to Bork:
It follows that the choice of "'fundamental values- by the Court cannot be justified. Where constitu-
tional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred. there is no principled way to prefer any
claimed human value to any other. The judge must stick close to the text and the history, and their fair
implications, and not construct new rights.
Bork. Neutral Prbciples and Some First Amendment Problems. 47 IND. L.J. I. 8 (1971).
108. See smpro notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
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III. NONINTERPRETIVE REVIEW AND THE INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR
OF THE SUPREME COURT
The introduction of this Article suggested that the Supreme Court's insti-
tutional behavior in constitutional adjudication provides guidance on the
question of the legitimacy of noninterpretive review, that the Court has long
ago resolved the legitimacy question, and that its resolution of that question
would be reflected by a consistent pattern of institutional behavior. It further
suggested that once the Court's own view about the nature of its function in
constitutional adjudication is fully understood, we will gain some insights into
the academic debate over the legitimacy of the Court's actions. This portion
of the Article analyzes the Court's actions and their relationship to the
Court's view of its function in constitutional adjudication. In the Court's
perception of that function, noninterpretive review is not only legitimate, but
is also a necessary postulate of constitutional adjudication under the Con-
stitution. The final portion of this Article offers a different perspective on the
legitimacy debate based on the conclusions that follow from an analysis of the
Court's institutional behavior.
If the interpretivists and the noninterpretivists agree on anything, it is
that the Supreme Court has not adhered to even the broadest form of inter-
pretive review.'09 According to Perry, "The decisions in virtually all modern
constitutional cases of importance ... cannot plausibly be explained except
in terms of noninterpretive review, because in virtually no such case can it
plausibly be maintained that the framers constitutionalized the determinative
value judgment." 0 Bork, after setting forth the criteria for legitimacy under
the interpretivist position, states that -[clourts must accept any value choice
the legislature makes unless it clearly runs contrary to a choice made in the
framing of the Constitution. " ' He then concludes:
It follows, of course, that broad areas of constitutional law ought to be re-
formulated. Most obviously, it follows that substantive due process ... is and
always has been an improper doctrine ....
The argument so far also indicates that most of substantive equal protection is
also improper. The modem Court, we need hardly be reminded, used the equal
protection clause the way the old Court used the due process clause. The only
change was in the values chosen for protection and the frequency with which the
Court struck down laws. " 2
109. The broadest form of interpretive review is the view espoused by Grano. See suprt text accompanying
notes 13-17 & 29-51.
110. PERRY. supra note 4. at II. The case is overstated here in the sense that Perry is referring to the
specific intentions of the framers. This reference is reflected in his use of the term "'determinative value
judgment." Grano has demonstrated that if the normative criteria are values constitutionalized by the framers
rather than their determinative value judgments. at least some of the modem constitutional cases of importance.
such as Brown and the other racial discrimination cases. can be supported under interpretive review. Grano.
-sitpra note 6. at 67-73.
11I. Bork. Neutral Principles and Some First Aenidment Problem.s. 47 IND. L.J. I. 10-11 (1971).
112. Id. at II. See also Grano. supra note 6. at 25-29.
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Echoing Bork in this regard, though with approval rather than disapproval,
Sandalow points out that "'[s]ubstantive equal protection,' like 'substantive
due process,' is nevertheless of continuing significance, providing the means
by which the Court may protect interests that have come to be viewed as
fundamental but that cannot easily be read into more specific constitutional
provisions limiting governmental power." 113
It would be redundant to continue the litany. While examples of nonin-
terpretive review appear in other areas, they appear most clearly in the
Court's treatment of the due process and equal protection clauses. From
Lochner to Roe, from economic freedom to fundamental personal rights, from
the protection of aliens to the protection of women, the Court clearly has not
seen its function in constitutional adjudication to be limited to implementing
the values constitutionalized by the framers. The Court itself has infused
values into the open-ended concepts of due process and equal protection. It
has long given due process a substantive meaning and has long held that the
equal protection clause protects all persons from arbitrary and unfair discrim-
ination. It has used these provisions to impose substantial limitations on
governmental power, going far beyond the intentions of the framers . 4
More significant, perhaps, for our present purposes, the Court has never
indicated that it recognized any distinction between interpretive and nonin-
terpretive review. The Court has not acted any differently when it based its
decision on a constitutional question on the specific intention of the framers" 5
than when it based its decision on values that the Court itself had infused into
particular provisions of the Constitution to invalidate a value choice made by
an electorally accountable body." 6 Nor has the Court ever seen the need to
discuss the legitimacy of its actions and the reasons it is not constrained in
constitutional adjudication by values purportedly constitutionalized by the
framers. Consequently, the Court has followed a consistent pattern of insti-
tutional behavior.
113. Sandalow. Consjtitjotal Interpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033. 1053 (1981).
114. See inira notes 139-58 and accompanying text. This Article does not discuss the relationship of either
the ninth amendment or the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment to the legitimacy of
noninterpretive review. Ely maintains that these provisions reflect the framers' intention that individuals should
have constitutional rights beyond those specified. Thus. these provisions justify noninterpretive review. J. ELY.
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30. 34-38 (1980). The Court. however, effectively precluded the privileges and
immunities clause from being a significant limitation on governmental action in The Slaughterhouse Cases. 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See Madden v. Kentucky. 309 U.S. 83.91-92 (1940). While three Justices relied on the
ninth amendment in Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). to support the newly found right of privacy.
this right was incorporated into substantive due process in Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). and the ninth
amendment has not surfaced again as a limitation on governmental action. Once the Court imputed a substantive
meaning to due process and relied on the due process clause to invalidate governmental action interfering with
individual rights. the debate over whether the privileges and immunities clause or the ninth amendment could be
a source of protection for individual rights became purely academic.
115. See. e.g.. Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78. 99 (1970) ("[tlhere is absolutely no indication in the "intent
of the Framers* " that the sixth amendment's guarantee of trial by jury necessarily required that ajury consist of
twelve persons): Wesberry v. Sanders. 376 U.S. I (1964) (framers intended by adoption of article I. § 2 that
apportionment of representation in United States House of Representatives should be based strictly on principle
of equal representation for equal numbers of people).
116. See. e.g.. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). and Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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The Court's institutional behavior as it bears on the legitimacy question is
best illustrated by the majority and dissenting opinions in Moore v. City of
East Cleveland."7 There the Court held that a municipal zoning ordinance
violated due process since it prohibited a grandmother from residing in a
household with her two grandchildren who were cousins rather than sib-
lings."8 Professor Grano cites Moore as the epitome of all that is wrong with
noninterpretive review: "[F]reed from the need to use the written Constitu-
tion as a source of judgment, noninterpretivist judges may select any source
that is personally appealing."" 9
Moore appears to be the only recent case in which any of the Justices has
even alluded to the legitimacy question, 2 0 that is, to the question whether it
was legitimate for the Court to engage in noninterpretive review. Justice
White did so in his dissent, and his discussion of the question is most instruc-
tive. Justice White, who disagreed strongly with the Court's reliance on sub-
stantive due process in this case to invalidate the application of the zoning law
to Mrs. Moore and her grandchildren, discussed the meaning that the Court
had previously given to the due process clause. He began by noting that "the
emphasis of the Due Process Clause is on 'process' . . . [and that it had been]
,ably and insistently argued in response to what were felt to be abuses by this
Court of its reviewing power,' that the Due Process Clause should be limited
'to a guarantee of procedural fairness."" 2 ' He further argued, however, that
the Court had long held that the due process clause has both a substantive and
a procedural content, '2 which all the Justices had recognized even if they
117. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
118. Id. at 499.
119. Grano. supra note 6. at 27. Again. when Grano refers to the written Constitution he is referring to
values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers.
120. Professor Grano's investigations called this discussion to my attention and have not revealed any
other case in which the legitimacy question was discussed. See Grano. supra note 6. at 27 n.117.
121. 431 U.S. 494. 542 (1977) (White, J.. dissenting) (quoting Poe v. Ullman. 367 U.S. 497. 540 (1961)
(Harlan. J.. dissenting)).
122. 431 U.S. 494. 542 (1977) (White. J.. dissenting). In The Slaughterhouse Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.
80-81 (1873). the Court summarily rejected the due process challenge without expressly indicating that it
considered the clause to have a substantive content. The Court referred to state court interpretations of due
process clauses in state constitutions, at least some of which had given the clauses a substantive meaning (see,
e.g.. Wynehamer v. People. 13 N.Y. 378, 398 (1856) (intemperance act is an unconstitutional deprivation of
property in the form of alcoholic beverages)), and simply stated that
[u]nder no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can
the restraint imposed by the state of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of New
Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision.
The Slaughterhouse Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36. 81 (1873).
Substantive due process could have been the only constitutional basis for the decision in Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875), in which the Court, without referring to the Constitution, struck down a
tax that financed a bonus to attract a private manufacturer to a city. The Court clearly recognized that due
process had a substantive meaning in cases such as Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), and Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623 (1887), in which it upheld state regulatory laws against due process challenges. In Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court invoked substantive due process to invalidate a state regulation of
insurance transactions entered into by out-of-state insurance companies. Finally, in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366 (1898), the Court sustained a state law regulating hours of labor in underground mines and smelters against a
due process challenge. It is clear, therefore, that the Court treated the due process clause as having a substantive
content in the years between Slaughterhouse and Lochner. although it generally sustained state regulatory laws
against due process challenges.
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disagreed on precisely how they should determine that substantive content. 12.1
At this point Justice White alluded to the matter of legitimacy:
Although the Court regularly proceeds on the assumption that the Due Process
Clause has more than a procedural dimension, we must always bear in mind that
the substantive content of the Clause is suggested neither by its language nor by
preconstitutional history; that content is nothing more than the accumulated pro-
duct of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This is not
to say that these cases should be overruled, or that the process by which they were
decided was illegitimate or even unacceptable, but only to underline Mr. Justice
Black's constant reminder to his colleagues that the Court has no license to inval-
idate legislation which it thinks merely arbitrary or unreasonable. 2 4
Justice White's allusion to the matter of legitimacy in the context of the
Court's giving due process a substantive content made it clear that the Court
had no doubt that it was acting legitimately when it did so or when it otherwise
engaged in noninterpretive review. Recall that Justice White himself invoked
substantive due process as the doctrinal basis for invalidating the Connecticut
anticontraception law in Griswold v. Connecticut.'2 5 Even Justice Rehnquist,
who regularly rails against the Court's reaching results that would have sur-
prised the framers, 126 has never suggested that those results were somehow
illegitimate.
The point to emphasize here is that while the Court in Moore was sharply
divided over the application of substantive due process doctrine in that case,
no Justice on the Court has ever disputed that it was legitimate for the Court
to have imputed a substantive meaning to the due process clause.'2 7 In the
only recent case, then, in which any member of the Court alluded to the
123. 431 U.S. 494. 542-43 (1977) (white. J.. dissenting).
124. fi. at 543-4 (emphasis added).
125. 381 U.S. 479. 502 (1965) (White. J.. concurring).
126. See. e.g.. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l. 431 U.S. 678. 717 (1977) (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting).
If those responsible for [the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendmentsl ... could have lived to
know that their efforts had enshrined in the Constitution the right of commercial vendors ofcontracep-
tives to peddle them to unmarried minors through such means as window displays and vending
machines located in the men's room of truck stops. notwithstanding the considered judgment of the
New York Legislature to the contrary, it is not difficult to imagine their reaction.
127. The most for which Justice White argued was that the Court should proceed with some degree of
caution when it engaged in noninterpretive review and that it should not invalidate the challenged law or
governmental action as readily as it would when it engaged in interpretive review. He stated: "'The Judiciary.
including this Court. is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or even the design of the Constitution.~
431 U.S. 494. 544 (1977) (White, J.. dissenting). Justice Powell responded to this argument:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There are risks when
the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of
the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the Lochnererademonstrates. there
is reason for concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become the predilections of those
who happen at the time to be Members of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint. But it
does not counsel abandonment. ...
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather
from careful -'respect for the teachings of history' [and) solid recognition of the basic values that
underline our society."
Id. at 502-03 (emphasis in original).
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legitimacy question, that Justice had no doubt that noninterpretive review
was fully legitimate.
Next, consider the relationship of noninterpretive review to the Court's
consistent pattern of institutional behavior in constitutional adjudication. The
Court's institutional behavior does not indicate that the Court recognizes any
distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive review. The reason is
that both the Court's view of its function in constitutional litigation and its
actions in deciding a constitutional question make that distinction completely
irrelevant. The Court views its function in constitutional adjudication as
defining the meaning of the Constitution and applying the provisions of the
Constitution, as they have been defined by the Court, to the challenged law or
governmental action. In the generic sense of the term, the Court is interpret-
ing the Consitution every time it passes on a constitutional question. Thus, it
invalidates laws or governmental action by interpreting the Consitution or by
referring to its definition of the consitutional provisions and their application
to the challenged law or governmental action.'
2
While this description of the Court's actions in constitutional adjudica-
tion may seem rather obvious, it is quite important in explaining why the
Court has never drawn any distinction between interpretive and noninterpre-
tive review. The Court views its function as establishing the meaning of all of
the provisions of the Constitution, 129 and it does not distinguish between kinds
of review when it is engaged in performing this function.
How the Court defines a particular constitutional provision depends, in
large part, on the nature of that provision. Some provisions, such as those
setting forth the requirements for election of a representative or senator, 130
convey a precise meaning from the text alone. This is also true of some
provisions imposing limitations on governmental power in order to protect
individual rights, such as the prohibition on ex post facto laws."'3 Because the
meaning of that provision is very clear from the text alone, no further ela-
boration of its meaning by the Court is needed, and it is not difficult to apply
that provision to a law claimed to violate it.'
32
The prohibitions contained in some other provisions of the Constitution
128. This Article uses the terms "-define- or -establish the meaning of- rather than the term "'interpet.'"
which the author would prefer, because the word "-interpret- has a connotation connected with interpretive
review. Analytically. the Court is deciding what meaning it will attach to the various constitutional provisions
and is determining the circumstances under which it will hold that a particular governmental action violates
those provisions.
129. This function includes the internal inferences that follow from the document as a whole and limit the
exercise of governmental power. The right to interstate travel is a right that derives from those internal infer-
ences. See Crandall v. Nevada. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868). See generally C. BLACK. STRUCTURE AND
REL-%IONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
130. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 2. c1. 2; id.. §3. cl. 5.
131. Id.. § 9. cl. 3; id.. § 10. cl. I.
132. The issue in an ex post facto challenge is whether the law imposes a punitive sanction for past conduct
that was lawful when performed. See. e.g.. Er parte Garland. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). If the law does not
impose a punitive sanction for past conduct, it does not violate the ex post facto clause, although past conduct is
the basis for the law's application. See. e.g.. Hawker v. New York. 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
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are also fairly specific, such as the prohibition against bills of attainder. The
term "bill of attainder" had a well-defined meaning at the time the Con-
stitution was adopted, and the prohibition was directed against a particular
kind of practice with which the framers were familiar. That provision can be
applied to a current practice by analogizing that practice to the practice with
which the framers were familiar and which they intended to prohibit by adopt-
ing that provision. 1
3
The meaning of some other provisions is also fairly clear from the text
alone, and the only problem is their application in particular circumstances.
The seventh amendment, for example, guarantees the right to trial by jury in
"suits at common law." 134 The Court applies that provision by examining the
components of a "suit at common law" at the time the seventh amendment
was adopted and by deciding whether the present proceeding, in which the
defendant claims a right to trial by jury, has essentially the same charac-
teristics as the historical "suit at common law." 1
35
In the above examples, the Court did not go beyond the text of the
provision in defining it because there was no need to do so. The provision was
a narrow one, and the text adequately conveyed its meaning. In light of that
meaning, derived from the text, the Court decided whether the provision
prohibited a particular practice.
Many provisions of the Constitution limiting governmental power in or-
der to protect individual rights are not narrow, however, and their meaning
cannot remotely be conveyed by the text alone. Quite to the contrary, these
provisions are often broadly phrased and open ended; they can best be de-
scribed as majestic generalities. These provisions require massive definition
to operate effectively as limitations on governmental power-as the framers
who promulgated them intended. 136 The first and fourteenth amendments, for
example, are all majestic generalities. So are some of the other provisions of
the Bill of Rights. Even provisions that are not framed in majestic generalities,
such as the sixth amendment's guarantee of a speedy and public trial, 3 ' are
sufficiently indeterminate in meaning to require a great deal of definition. ' 3
133. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
135. See, e.g., Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974). See
also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (application of collateral estoppel doctrine does not
violate seventh amendment).
136. Dean Ely suggests: "If a principled approach to judicial enforcement of the Constitution's open-ended
provisions cannot be developed, one that is not hopelessly inconsistent with the nation's commitment to
representative democracy, responsible commentators must consider seriously the possibility that courts simply
should stay away from them.'" J. ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 41 (1980). However, Chief Justice
Marshall observed in Marbtuv: **It cannot be presumed that any clause in the Constitution is intended to be
without effect.. ." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 174 (1803). When massive definition is
necessary to ensure that these provisions operate effectively as limitations on governmental power. thejudiciary
must supply that massive definition since it is the responsibility of the federal judiciary to establish the meaning
of all of the provisions of the Constitution.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
138. See. e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale. 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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Accordingly, constitutional adjudication is concerned with defining and
applying constitutional provisions, many of which are broadly phrased and
open ended and so do not convey much meaning in their text alone. The Court
has done this ever since Marbtry asserted and recognized the power of
judicial review. 139 In establishing the meaning of the Constitution the Court
has not recognized any distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive
review.
In establishing the meaning of the Constitution and in applying its provi-
sions in particular circumstances, the Court has been very eclectic. Some-
times the Court has taken a strictly historical approach, looking to the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision as it was understood by the framers when it
was adopted,140 or looking to the specific intentions of the framers to deter-
mine whether that provision protected a particular activity.14' At other times
the Court has defined the constitutional provisions on the basis of internal
inferences that follow from the structure of the Constitution: for example,
when it interpreted the affirmative grant of the commerce power to Congress
to include, by negative implication, limitations on the power of the states to
regulate interstate commerce;142 or when it found that the right of interstate
travel is a basic, generic right "fundamental to the concept of our Federal
Union."43
At still other times the Court has looked to the "broad, organic pur-
pose" 144 of a constitutional provision to justify extending constitutional protec-
tion to an individual right, such as the right to interracial marriage, that the
framers probably did not perceive as being protected by that provision when it
was promulgated.' 45 In other contexts the Court has made significant value
judgments in defining a particular constitutional provision-for example, in
determining whether the free exercise clause was meant to protect practices
based on religious beliefs or only the profession of religious beliefs. '
46
In defining the broadly phrased and open-ended provisions of the Consti-
tution-the majestic generalities-the Court has not felt constrained to search
139. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
140. See supra note 110.
141. In Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). the Court held that obscene speech was not within the
protection of the first amendment, on the ground that there was "'sufficient contemporaneous evidence to show
that [at the time of the adoption of the first amendment] obscenity ... was outside the protection intended for
speech and press.** Id. at 483.
142. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). See generally C. BLACK. STRUC-
TURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-22 (1969).
143. United States v. Guest. 383 U.S. 745. 757 (1966). See also C. BLACK. STRUCTURE AND RELATION-
SHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15-17. 27-29 (1%9).
144. Loving v. Virginia. 388 U.S. 1. 9 (1967).
145. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
146. Compare Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (religious practice of bigamy is not constitu-
tionally protected). with Cantwell v. Connecticut. 3 10 U.S. 296 (1940) (efforts to persuade passersby to buy a
book or contribute money in the interest of religion constitutionally protected). While the free exercise clause
embodies an "'absolute prohibition of infringements on the 'freedom to believe,"' it requires a delicate balanc-
ing when the infringement is directed at acts and conduct based on religious beliefs. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618. 627 (1978).
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for values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers. Since the Court has
the responsibility to establish the meaning of those provisions, 47 it has never
doubted that it was acting legitimately when, in the process of defining those
provisions, it made the appropriate value judgments and the necessary value
infusions. For example, although the primary concern of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause may have been to prevent
discrimination against the newly emancipated blacks, the Court has defined
that clause by referring to the text -"[n]o State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" 14 8-and has held that
the clause protects all persons against arbitrary and invidious dis-
crimination. 149 Thus, the equal protection clause has been interpreted to pro-
hibit discrimination on the basis of alienage,' 50 illegitimacy,' 5' and gender;' 52
to prohibit disadvantaging poor persons in certain ways;' 53 and to impose
limits on the power of the government to classify, particularly when the
classifications impinge on fundamental rights. 54 So, too, while the framers of
the fifth and fourteenth amendment's due process clause may have seen the
clause as embodying only a guarantee of procedural fairness, '55 the Court, in
defining that clause, has focused on the terms "liberty" and "property" and
147. "it is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.**
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 177 (1803). See also United States v. Nixon. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
The Court stated in Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. I. 18 (1957): "'In 1803. [Marbry . . . declared the basic
principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution. and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system." The duty to say what the law is includes the responsibility to define all the provisions of
the Constitution, including those that are broadly phrased and open ended. See also supra note 136.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § I.
149. The Court's definition of the equal protection clause in this manner is clearly illustrated by Yick Wo v.
Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Although Yick Wo is often analyzed as a racial or national origin discrimination
case. at the time it was decided the Court treated it as an alienage discrimination case. Yick Wo and most of the
other Chinese launderers in San Francisco were subjects of China. The Court emphasized that their status as
aliens could not justify the discrimination admittedly practiced against them.
The rights of the petitioners, as affected by the proceedings of which they complain, are not less
because they are aliens and subjects of the Emperor of China....
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protection of citizens....
These provisions are universal in their application .... The questions we have to consider and decide
in these cases, therefore, are to be treated as involving the rights of every citizen of the United States
equally with those of the strangers and aliens who now invoke the jurisdiction of the court.
Id. at 369.
150. Id. at 356. See also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
151. See, e.g.. Levy v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
152. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
153. See. e.g.. Tate v. Short. 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (it is denial of equal protection to fine those able to pay
but to convert that fine to imprisonment for those who cannot): Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (it is
denial of equal protection to deny counsel to indigent defendants taking an appeal as of right from their
convictions).
154. The interests that receive a high degree of protection, such as reproductive freedom, marriage. and
family interests, are now referred to as fundamental rights. General classifications, however. may also be invalid
under the purportedly less restrictive rational basis standard of review. Compare Zobel v. Williams. 102 S. Ct.
2309 (1982) (Alaska's benefit distribution plan violated equal protection by discriminating on the basis of the
length of residence in state). ith Schweiker v. Wilson. 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (equal protection not violated by
denial of Supplemental Security Income to individuals institutionalized in institutions that do not receive
Medicaid funds).
155. This is the contention of the interpretivists. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. Justice
White made this point in Moore. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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has imputed a substantive meaning to that clause. 56 In so doing, the Court has
necessarily had to infuse values into the due process clause, 57-the economic
freedom value in the Lochner era and the personal freedom value in what the
interpretivists would call the Roe era. On the basis of those value infusions
the Court has decided whether particular laws or governmental actions vi-
olated due process. 158
Analytically and behaviorally, the Court has defined the provisions of the
Constitution and determined their applicability to particular laws or govern-
mental action in light of those definitions. The Court did not act any dif-
ferently when it engaged in noninterpretive review than when it engaged in
interpretive review. It did not act any differently when it decided Roe, for
example, than when it decided whether the sixth amendment's trial by jury
guarantee required a jury of twelve persons.159 Nor did it act any differently
when it defined provisions of the Constitution at any time during its history.
In all of these instances the Court was performing its constitutional function
to "'say what the law is." '60 To the extent that the Court made value judg-
ments that may have been different from those supposedly made by the fram-
ers, and to the extent that it infused values into broadly phrased and open-
ended provisions such as the due process and equal protection clauses instead
of limiting itself to values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers in
those clauses, the Court did not question the legitimacy of its actions. The
Court was simply establishing the meaning of the Constitution, which is its
long-recognized function in our constitutional system.
The Court has always rooted its constitutional decision making in the text
or internal inferences of the Constitution. It has not claimed any power as the
protector of moral values, 6 or as the purifier of representative democracy,-
62
or as the institution best able to protect fundamental rights,' 63 to override
electorally accountable policy making, and to prescribe the fundamental poli-
cies and values of American society.64 Rather, the Court has simply been
156. See supra note 122.
157. The Court must do this to decide what kinds of interests would receive a high degree of protection
under the due process clause.
158. Even after the Court makes value infusions, it must also make what may be called specific value
judgments to determine whether a particular law or governmental action is inconsistent with the values the
Court has infused into the due process clause. Sometimes this determination requires the Court to decide
whether a particular individual interest that reflects those values is constitutionally more important than the
asserted governmental interest relied on to restrict the individual interest. This kind of constitutional balancing
lies at the heart of much due process adjudication. Roe v. Wade. for example, cannot be explained on any other
basis than constitutional balancing: the Court concluded that the pregnant Woman's interest in reproductive
freedom. or the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy before the stage of viability, was constitutionally
more important than the state's interest in protecting potential human life from the moment of conception. 410
U.S. 113. 147-56. 166 (1973).
159. See Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
160. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 177 (1803). See also sutpra note 147.
161. This is Perry'sjustification for noninterpretive review. See supra notes59-63 and accompanying text.
162. This is Ely's justification for noninterpretive review when it is participation oriented and representa-
tion reinforcing. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
163. This is Brest's justification for noninterpretive review. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
164. This is Grano's description of the Court's activities when it engages in noninterpretive review. See
_%tpra notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
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establishing the meaning of the Constitution and determining its application to
laws or governmental action challenged as violating the Constitution. Precise-
ly because the Constitution contains so many broadly phrased and open-
ended provisions, the Court, in defining those provisions, has not hesitated to
engage in noninterpretive review.
In other words, the Court apparently believes that it is acting legitimately
as long as it looks to the text or internal inferences of the Constitution as the
starting point for its constitutional decisions.' 65 The Court likewise apparently
believes that it is acting legitimately when, in the process of defining broadly
phrased and open-ended limitations on governmental power contained in the
Constitution, it goes beyond values purportedly constitutionalized by the
framers. It has not looked to these criteria as the sole or even the primary
source of meaning for the Constitution or for its application to particular
situations at a much later time in the Nation's history. The Court has not
viewed interpretive review as a tenable methodology for determining the
meaning and application of the Constitution. Rather, it has viewed noninter-
pretive review as a necessary postulate for constitutional adjudication under
the Constitution. The Court, therefore, has engaged in noninterpretive review
throughout its history, convinced that its actions were legitimate and consistent
with the Court's function under our constitutional system.
Noninterpretive review, however, does not imply a complete absence of
constraint on constitutional decision making. Constraints on constitutional
decision making inhere in the nature of the judicial process and in the Court's
concern that it perform its constitutional function in a manner that will not
diminish public respect for, and acceptance of, that function.
Constitutional decision making, like any other judicial decision making,
operates within a recognized judicial framework. In making constitutional
decisions the Court refers to the facts of particular cases. It considers pre-
cedents, even if it does not always follow them. The Court tries to set forth a
well-reasoned elaboration for the bases of its decisions, and its decisions in
one case build on, and are related to, decisions in other cases. Sandalow has
observed: "The meaning that we give to them [constitutional provisions]
...must take account of the line of their growth.""66 The meaning of a
165. --A decision limiting governmental power must be grounded in a limitation on governmental poer
contained in the Constitution.- Sandalow. Constitutional Interpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033. 1050 (1981).
Similarly. Munzer and Nickel have stated:
Though the Constitution is a complex union of text and institutional practice. the text is still sufficiently
central to this practice to make a suitable relation to the text the key to constitution-identity. Our basic
contention, roughly stated, is that a rule or decision is part of our constitutional law just in case it is
found in the text or stands in ancestral relation to the text. Ancestry obtains when there is an interpre-
tation of the text. or a chain of interpretations at least one of which is eventually tied to the text. which
yields the rule or decision.
Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1054 (1977).
166. Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1054 (1981) (quoting Gompers v.
United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914)).
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constitutional provision develops incrementally, and that provision's line of
growth strongly influences its application in particular cases.' 67 The frame-
work within which constitutional decision making has operated, then, is a
significant constraint on the results that the Court will reach when it is en-
gaged in that decision making.' 68
The Court views its constitutional function as establishing the meaning of
the Constitution and enforcing the Constitution's limitations on the exercise
of governmental power. As it performs that function the Court realizes that it
must not dilute the strength of the Constitution's limitations by too readily
invalidating governmental action that does not interfere with important indi-
vidual rights.' 69 Since invalidating governmental action on constitutional
grounds is a serious matter, the Court will always exercise that power with
restraint, recognizing that the Constitution must not be trivialized by its too
casual application. Likewise, the Court understands that there are limits on
167. For over four decades the Supreme Courts approach to the constitutionality of governmental regula-
tion of enterprise activity under the due process clause has been to give great deference to governmental
economic regulation generally, even when the regulation affects individual property rights rather than enterprise
activity. See. e.g.. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group. Inc.. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). This deference is
consistent with seeing the line of growth of the due process clause as a limitation on governmental power in the
economic regulation area. Similarly, the Court's protection of reproductive freedom, whether tinder the rubric
of equal protection, right of privacy, or substantive due process, can be traced in a line of progression from
Skinner v. Oklahoma. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute that allowed sterilization of certain habitual criminals violated
equal protection clause), through Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). and Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (statutes forbidding contraception unconstitutional), to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(criminal abortion laws unconstitutional). In other words, by the time the Court decided Roe v. Wade, constitu-
tional protection for reproductive freedom had been firmly established.
The issue in Roe was whether the Court should extend that protection to a woman's decision to terminate
an unwanted pregnancy by a medical abortion. Roe differed from the other reproductive freedom cases because
in Roe the State was able to assert a substantial interest to justify interference with a woman's reproductive
freedom. namely. the protection of potential human life. Because of the importance of the asserted govern-
mental interest, it would not have been inconsistent with the line of growth of constitutional protection for
reproductive freedom for the Court to have held that the asserted governmental interest in protecting potential
human life was constitutionally more important than the woman's interest in reproductive freedom. For ex-
ample. Justice White. who took the position in his concurring opinion in Griswold. 381 U.S. 479. 502 (1965), that
the Connecticut anticontraception statute violated due process, maintained in his dissenting opinion in Roe. 410
U.S. 113. 221-23 (1973). that the Texas antiabortion statute did not. But because the Court had previously held
that reproductive freedom is entitled to constitutional protection, the holding in Roe. extending that protection
to the abortion decision, was fully consistent with the line of growth of constitutional protection for reproduc-
tive freedom.
168. To stress the element of choice in constitutional interpretation is not to argue that contemporary
discretion is unlimited, but only that the limits are not those imposed by the language and pre-adoption
history of the Constitution. The limits, so far as they exist, are those that have developed over time in
the ongoing process of valuation that occurs in the name of the Constitution. So understood, the limits
upon permissible constitutional interpretation are not external constraints upon our ability to read the
Constitution as the embodiment of the current values: they are, rather, the elements of reason that are
intrinsic to the process of determining whether a proposed interpretation truly reflects those values.
Sandalow. Constittional Interpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033. 1054-55 (1981).
169. The so-called two-tier standard of review, under which the Court gives greater scrutiny to govern-
mental action affecting fundamental rights, might be considered a manifestation of that concern. Regardless of
the extent to which that standard of review is result determinative, as the importance of the individual interest
recedes, governmental action interfering with that interest is undoubtedly less likely to be unconstitutional. In
Kelley v. Johnson. 425 U.S. 238 (1976). for example, the majority did not consider important an individual's
interest in wearing a particular hairstyle. As a result, it sustained the constitutionality of a police hairstyle
regulation, even though the governmental interest in maintaining uniformity of appearance among police officers
was weak. Id. at 248. In contrast, the dissent considered the interest in personal appearance important because
of its close relationship to an individual's personality and lifestyle. Id. at 250-51 (Marshall. J.. dissenting).
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how far it can go in restricting electorally accountable policy making. The
Court is concerned both with maintaining the importance of electorally ac-
countable policy making (notwithstanding that the Court sometimes invali-
dates that policy making on constitutional grounds) and with not undermining
public acceptance of its function of judicial review by rendering outrageous
constitutional decisions. 70
The Court's concern with the limits of constitutionalization appears most
clearly in its treatment of open-ended constitutional provisions such as the
due process and equal protection clauses. While critics of noninterpretive
review have directed their fire at the Court's fundamental rights adjudication
under these provisions,' the Court itself has stopped short of extending
unalloyed protection to individual interests on the basis of fundamental rights.
The number of fundamental rights has been limited, 2 and the Court has
refrained from creating any new ones. 173 Nor has the Court used the equal
protection clause to impose on the government the general obligation to con-
sider inequality of economic or social condition-that is, to alter the essential
class structure of American society. Facially neutral laws generally are not
unconstitutional simply because they operate to deny lower-income persons
the same opportunities that are available to the more affluent. 7 4 To summar-
ize, the Court's use of the due process and equal protection clauses to protect
individual rights has reflected a considerable degree of restraint, and the
Court's decisions in this area have not effected a radical transformation in the
way that American society must operate under the Constitution.
Because constraints on constitutional decision making inhere in the na-
ture of the judicial process and in the Court's concern that it perform its
constitutional function in a manner that will not diminish public respect for.
and acceptance of, that function, noninterpretive review certainly has not
undermined the foundations of representative democracy, as the interpretivist
critics sometimes imply.
IV. THE LEGITIMACY OF NONINTERPRETIVE REVIEW:
A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
A. Noninterpretive Review and the Structure of Constitutional Governance
This portion of the Article presents a different perspective on the legit-
imacy question, one derived from an analysis of the Supreme Court's institu-
170. For example, in view of the importance of marriage and the family in American society, it is highly
unlikely that the Court would hold that the Constitution recognizes a right of homosexual marriage.
171. See suprt notes 46-50 & H 1-13 and accompanying text.
172. At the present time fundamental rights, for purposes of the two-tier standard of review under due
process and equal protection, seem limited to the right to vote. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663
(1966): the right to travel. Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618 (1969): reproductive freedom. Roe v. Wade. 41)
U.S. 113 (1973): and marriage and the family. Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494 (19771.
173. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307(1976) (governmental employment
is not a fundamental right); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (education is not a
fundamental right); Lindsey v. Normet. 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing is not a fundamental right).
174. See, e.g.. Maher v. Roe. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (equal protection does not require state to pay expenses
of nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (Constitution does
not forbid state to impose fee for bankruptcy proceeding on indigents).
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tional behavior in constitutional adjudication. In this adjudicative process the
Court has simply assumed the legitimacy of noninterpretive review. This
section relates the Court's institutional behavior to the structure of constitu-
tional governance established by the Constitution and concludes that nonin-
terpretive review is not only legitimate, but is also a necessary postulate for
constitutional adjudication.
The legitimacy question is framed as follows: Is it consistent with the
function of the judiciary in our constitutional system for the courts to resolve
constitutional questions by a methodology that is not based solely or even
primarily on values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers? The inter-
pretivist position, of course, is that it is not. According to Grano, -[T]o be
constitutionally legitimate ... a methodology of judicial review must be at
least within the implicit scope of authority that article III grants to the federal
judiciary."'" Thus, the judiciary does not have the authority to "constitu-
tionalize values not inferable from the Constitution itself."1 76 Since judicial
review results in the invalidation of electorally accountable policy making,
and since, according to the interpretivists, the Constitution commits us to
177
representative democracy, the only legitimate constitutional restraints on
electorally accountable policy making are those that the framers intended to
impose. Those restraints, under the broadest view of interpretivism, must be
determined by referring to the values that the framers intended to consti-
tutionalize.178 Therefore, the interpretivists argue, noninterpretivist review is
not legitimate because it is not within the authority of the judiciary under our
constitutional system. Under this system, they say, the judiciary's authority
is limited to invalidating electorally accountable policy making only when the
particular exercise of that policy making is inconsistent with values that the
framers intended to constitutionalize.
The interpretivist position is correct insofar as it maintains that the legit-
imacy question must be determined by referring to the Constitution itself. It is
more accurate, however, to say that the answer to the legitimacy question
must be found in the structure of the Constitution: 79 Is noninterpretive re-
view inconsistent with the structure of constitutional governance established
by the Constitution? A careful analysis of that structure of constitutional
175. Grano, supra note 6. at 4 (footnote omitted).
176. Id. at 64. He is referring to values that were not constitutionalized by the framers.
177. The noninterpretivists have not expressly challenged this point. See supra subpart II(A).
178. Grano, supra note 6, at 16, 17.
179. Thus. I am constrained to disagree with the broad functional justification for noninterpretive review
proffered by Perry and Brest. While Ely purports to find a functional justification for participation-oriented and
representation-reinforcing noninterpretive review in the constitutional structure. I view constitutional structure
quite differently than Ely does. Most significant. I do not see a commitment to representative democracy as an
important part of that constitutional structure. Furthermore. Ely has not succeeded in sustaining his position
that the structure of the Constitution is process oriented. See. e.g.. Tribe. The PtzJzing Persistence oJ Process-
Bawed Constitttional Theories. 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
-% crucial difference exists between the structural justification for noninterpretive review and what is called
the consistency or general intention justification. Structural justification has nothing to do with the intentions of
the framers, no matter how broadly those intentions may be construed. Its focus is entirely on the structure of
the Constitution that the framers promulgated and on the broadly phrased and open-ended provisions that they
put into it. See hinra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. Since the structural justification for noninterpretive
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governance will demonstrate most clearly that the interpretivist position on
the legitimacy of noninterpretivist review is completely untenable. Noninter-
pretive review is not only consistent with the structure of constitutional
governance established by the Constitution, but is also fully supportive of that
structure. Given the structure of constitutional governance established by the
Constitution, noninterpretive review is not only legitimate, but is also a
necessary postulate for constitutional adjudication.
The argument that noninterpretive review is fully supportive of constitu-
tional governance established by the Constitution proceeds as follows: (1) The
overriding principle in the structure of constitutional governance established
by the Constitution is the limitation on governmental power. (2) Many of the
limitations on governmental power designed to protect individual rights that
are contained in the Constitution are broadly phrased and open ended, and
these majestic generalities directed toward the protection of individual rights
are a part of our constitutional tradition. (3) Since many of the limitations on
governmental power contained in the Constitution are broadly phrased and
open ended, these limitations cannot be fully operable in contemporary soci-
ety as a limitation on governmental power if their meaning is determined
solely or even primarily by referring to values purportedly constitutionalized
by the framers at an earlier time. (4) Therefore, given items (1) and (3) above,
noninterpretive review is not only legitimate, but is also a necessary postulate
for constitutional adjudication under our constitutional system.
Two preliminary points should be made before the above propositions
are developed more fully. First, an analysis of the legitimacy of noninter-
pretive review based on the structure of constitutional governance established
by the Constitution in no way depends on the intention of the framers, even in
the most general sense. That analysis looks to the structure of the Constitu-
tion that the framers promulgated and adopted to discover what they did in
the document itself rather than what they intended or what they may have
thought they were doing. In other words, we are not looking at the mental
state of the framers, but at the document that they ordained and established
for themselves and their posterity. That document established the structure to
which we look to determine the legitimacy of noninterpretive review.'s°
review is developed independently of the function of the federal judiciary in our constitutional scheme, it does
not depend at all on the intentions of the framers regarding the function of the federal judiciary or the exercise of
judicial review.
Nonetheless. a marked similarity exists between the structural justification and the general intention justifi-
cation proposed by Sandalow. Sandalow was not attempting to set forth a justification for noninterpretive
review, but instead was describing how the Supreme Court has established the meaning of the Constitution in
light of changing circumstances and changing values. In this way he has. in effect, provided a justification for
noninterpretive review based on the general intention of the framers, most particularly their intention that the
Constitution was to be an enduring document. Therefore. the meaning of particular constitutional provisions
may properly change from one generation to another. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text. While
structural justification approaches the question from a different perspective, it reflects the influence of
Sandalow's analysis.
180. We look at the structure that the fiamers established without regard to what they necessarily intended
would happen under that structure.
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Second, the analysis of the legitimacy of noninterpretive review based on
the structure of constitutional governance established by the Constitution
does not in any way relate to the function of the federal judiciary in our
constitutional system. The structure of constitutional governance operates
regardless of judicial review and would be the same even if judicial review did
not exist. The structure of constitutional governance binds all branches of the
federal government and the states, and it represents the sovereign and su-
preme will of the people of the United States,"' determining how they and
their posterity should be governed. The Constitution, in the broadest sense, is
a political document conveying the wishes of the people of the United States
in the matter of their governance.
The federal judiciary comes into play only because under our consti-
tutional system the function of the federal judiciary is to establish the meaning
of the Constitution, and the judiciary's view of the meaning of the Constitu-
tion is binding on the other branches of the federal government 82 and on the
183states. If it is fully consistent with the structure of constitutional govern-
ance established by the Constitution that the meaning of constitutional provi-
sions in contemporary society need not be determined solely or even primar-
ily by referring to values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers, then
the federal judiciary, in performing its recognized constitutional function to
determine the meaning of the Constitution, can legitimately engage in non-
interpretive review. Therefore, the argument that noninterpretive review is
legitimate develops independently of the function of the federal judiciary in
our constitutional system. Since noninterpretive review is fully consistent
with the structure of constitutional governance established by the Constitu-
tion, the judiciary acts legitimately when, in performing its constitutional
function, it engages in noninterpretive review.
'84
B. The Overriding Constitutional Principle: Limitation on Governmental
Power
The overriding principle in the structure of constitutional governance
established by the Constitution is the principle of limitation on governmental
181. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 176-77 (1803). An underlying-and apparently undis-
puted-premise of American constitutional theory is that the Constitution emanates directly from the people of
the United States. Id.
182. The Court noted in Powell v. McCormack. 395 U.S. 486. 549 (1969). that its determination that
Congress has the power to refuse to seat a member would not result in --multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question" because "it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution.~
183. As it has been ever since the decision in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
184. To illustrate further, suppose that Congress. rather than the Court. is engaging in noninterpretive
review. Suppose that Congress is deciding whether it has the power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment to
enact a law prohibiting state and local governments from discriminating on the basis of gender. See. e.g..
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress may. under the fourteenth amendment, authorize suits
against states that are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts). Since the framers of the fourteenth
amendment clearly did not constitutionalize the value of gender equality. Congress could not constitutionally
enact the above law if noninterpretive review were illegitimate under the Constitution. The point here is that the
1983]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
power rather than the principle of representative democracy. Once this point
is fully understood, the supposed tension between noninterpretive review and
representative democracy is substantially diminished. Since noninterpretive
review supports the overriding principle of limitation on governmental power,
it is irrelevant that noninterpretive review results in the invalidation of elec-
torally accountable policy making. The principle of limitation on government-
al power is more important than the principle of electorally accountable policy
making in the structure of governance established by the Constitution.
This point also completely undermines the essence of the interpretivist
position, which is based on the primacy of representative democracy (that is.
electorally accountable policy making) and the necessarily undemocratic
character of judicial review. The interpretivists maintain that the only limits
on otherwise plenary majority rule are those imposed by the Constitution s'
and that those limits should be determined by referring to values purportedly
constitutionalized by the framers. Otherwise, the judiciary, which is not elec-
torally accountable, would be engaged in policy making, which is inconsistent
with the principle of representative democracy.
The interpretivists and the others who see a purported tension between
noninterpretive review and representative democracy have missed the point,
because they have simply miscontrued the structure of constitutional govern-
ance established by the Constitution. They have given a constitutional signi-
ficance to representative democracy that cannot reasonably be inferred from
this structure. The overriding principle in the structure of constitutional gov-
ernance, which is clear from a reading of the provisions of the original Con-
stitution and the Bill of Rights,86 is not the principle of representative democ
racy, but the principle of limitation on governmental power.
Representative democracy is an important principle in our structure of
constitutional governance, but it certainly is not the overriding one. The
structure makes it clear that the legislative and executive branches of the
federal government are electorally accountable, directly or indirectly.' 87 The
Constitution directed that those who held the reins of federal legislative and
executive power must be electorally accountable. But the same structure also
makes it abundantly clear that the framers were not willing to put their faith in
representative democracy to prevent abuses of governmental power. The
framers were seriously concerned about abuse of governmental power, no
legitimacy question could arise even if the judiciary did not engage in judicial review. The question is still
whether the meaning of the Constitution-established by any branch-must be determined solely with reference
to the values that purportedly were constitutionalized by the framers.
185. Bork is the strongest exponent of this position. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
186. The Bill of Rights is properly considered a part of the structure of constitutional governance estab-
lished by the original Constitution. because it was promulgated "practically contemporaneous with the adoption
of the original [Constitution].- The Slaughterhouse Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36.67 (1873).
187. Similarly. those branches of the state governments are electorally accountable under their state
constitution,.
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matter how electorally accountable the government was.' 88 If the framers had
put their faith in representative democracy alone, they would have considered
their task at an end when they established electorally accountable legislative
and executive branches. The structure of governance established by the
Constitution indicates that the framers resoundingly rejected that approach.
The framers were not only concerned about abuse of governmental pow-
er: they were also concerned about the protection of individual rights from the
actions of any government, no matter how electorally accountable that
government was. So, in the same Consitution-referring only to the original
Constitution-they imposed substantial limitations on the exercise of power
by the newly created federal government. 89 Although the Constitution dealt
only with the reservation of powers to the federal government, the framers
imposed comparable and additional limitations on the powers of the state
governments.190 A few years later the Bill of Rights was adopted, imposing a
whole new set of limitations on the power of the federal government. '91
The message that the framers were trying to convey through the structure
of constitutional governance that they established is clear from a reading of
the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights. The framers were saying on
behalf of the "people of the United States" to -[them]selves and [their]
Posterity": -92 "'We believe in representative democracy, and since we must
have a government, that government should be electorally accountable. But
we are fearful of government. We are concerned about abuse of governmental
power. There are certain things that we don't want any government, no
matter how electorally accountable, to be able to do. Above all, we want to
protect certain individual rights-fundamental rights, if you will-from any
governmental interference. So, in this Constitution, reflecting the structure of
constitutional governance that we have established, we have placed numer-
ous and often sweeping limitations on governmental power."
A fair reading of the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights strongly
supports the proposition that the overriding principle of the structure of con-
stitutional governance under the Consitution is the principle of limitation on
governmental power rather than the principle of representative democracy. 193
Our Constitution is "chock full" of limitations on governmental power and
says to the government time and time again, "Thou shall not." This would be
188. Tribe has noted that '[al Bill of Rights directed against federal abuses was thought necessary in
addition to the separation and division of powers." L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1-2. at 3
(1978). For additional sources. see id. n.7.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 9.
190. Id. § 10. This is in addition to the federalism limitations imposed by art. IV. §§ 1. 2.
191. As far as the structure of constitutional governance is concerned, the Bill of Rights is properly treated
together with the limitations established by the original Constitution. See supra note 186.
192. U.S. CONST. preamble.
193. This principle is also reflected by the promulgation of the fourteenth amendment, with its broadly
phrased and open-ended limitations on state governmental power. and by the limitations on state governmental
po%%er contained in the original Constitution and other subsequent amendments.
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rather strange constitutional behavior if the overriding constitutional principle
were a commitment to representative democracy. Our Constitution embodies
the fundamental concept that no government, no matter how democratic and
no matter how electorally accountable it may be, can violate important in-
dividual rights. The government cannot do certain things simply because no
government should ever be able to do them. 94
Since the overriding principle of the structure of constitutional govern-
ance established by our Constitution is the principle of limitation on gov-
ernmental power, not the principle of representative democracy, it is irrele-
vant that noninterpretive review is purportedly inconsistent with the principle
of representative democracy. Regardless of our political commitment to rep-
resentative democracy, it simply does not have overriding importance in our
structure of constitutional governance. What is most important in that struc-
ture is the principle of limitation on governmental power. To the extent that
noninterpretive review reinforces that limitation and expands the protection
of individual rights, it furthers implementation of the overriding principle in
the structure of constitutional governance. Thus, the interpretivist position.
which is premised on the primacy of representative democracy and the un-
democratic character of judicial review, is completely undermined.
C. The Constitution's Majestic Generalities
Many of the Constitution's limitations on governmental power that are
designed to protect individual rights are broadly phrased and open ended. The
interpretivists insist that the courts must identify the values that the framers
intended to constitutionalize in the various provisions of the Constitution and
that they must decide on the validity of a challenged law or governmental
action solely by referring to those values. 95  But it has not been demon-
strated-to take the framework urged by the interpretivists-that the framers
intended to constitutionalize values at all when they promulgated constitu-
tional provisions. If they intended to constitutionalize values and to give those
provisions a discrete and narrow meaning based on those values, that inten-
tion is not manifested in the provisions that the framers promulgated. Looking
to the text of the provisions to determine what values the framers purportedly
intended to constitutionalize does not provide much guidance on the meaning
of the very broad values contained in those provisions. For example. in the
194. Thus. it is not accurate to view the limitations on governmental power contained in the Constitution.
as Bork does. as an effort to accommodate -majority and minority freedom.- Bork. Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems. 47 IND. L.J.1. 2-3 (197 1). The fundamental idea expressed in the Constitu-
tion is not that there are limitations on the power of political majorities in order to protect political minorities.
but that the power of the government must be limited to protect individual rights. The dichotomy is not bet%%een
majority and minority, then. but between government and the individual, and our Constitution comes down very
strongly in favor of protecting the individual.
195. This assertion is derived from the broad view of interpretivism espoused by Grano. Narrow interpre-
tivists. such as Berger. would say that the decision has to be based on specific value judgments of the framers
with reference to historical analogues of those laws.
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first amendment the framers intended to constitutionalize the values of free-
dom of speech and freedom of religion. But this statement gives no more
guidance than does a reading of the text alone. Likewise, the value that the
framers constitutionalized in the text of the equal protection clause is the
extremely broad value of equality, which is not very helpful as an analytical
tool. let alone as a definitive guide in determining the meaning of the equal
protection clause.96
To identify values that the framers purportedly constitutionalized in
particular constitutional provisions, the interpretivists fall back on the
framers' purpose in promulgating those provisions. The interpretivists are
unconcerned that this intention cannot be supported by the text of the provi-
sion itself. Nor does it matter that they have no historical evidence that the
framers intended to constitutionalize values. It is enough, say the interpre-
tivists, to be able to ascertain what the framers wanted to accomplish with a
particular provision; given that purpose, the interpretivists assume that the
framers intended to constitutionalize a certain value in that provision.
The interpretivist line then becomes: "Although this may be what the
framers said, what they really meant was . . . ." The text of the equal protec-
tion clause, for example, is quite clear: "No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 197 What the
framers meant to say, if we accept the position of Grano, was not that at all.
What they really meant to say was: "No state shall discriminate against any
person on grounds of race or national origin."' 9 If this is what the framers
meant to say, why didn't they simply say it? Grano and the other inter-
pretivists never explain why the framers apparently were incapable of saying
what they meant. May it then be, perhaps, that the framers really did mean
what they said?' 99
196. Professor Westen even stated: "Equality ... is an empty form having no substantive content of its
own.'" Westen. The Einpty Idea oJ Equality. 95 HARV. L. REV. 537. 596 (1982). Similarly. Brest observed:
"'1B]ecause of its indeterminacy, the [equal protection] clause does not offer much guidance even in resolving
particular issues of discrimination based on race." Brest. The Misconceived Quest for the Original Under-
standi,. 60 B.U.L. REV. 204. 232 (1980).
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § I.
198. According to Berger. what they meant to say was that no state should discriminate against blacks in
the enjoyment of certain specific rights. See supra text accompanying note 25.
199. Professor Dimond provides historical evidence that the framers considered and rejected narrow lan-
guage that would have limited the protections of that provision to the newly emancipated blacks:
IlI]n the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. [John] Bingham proposed the following amendment:
'The Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in
every state within this Union equal protection in their rights of life. liberty and property." Thaddeus
Stevens countered with [a proposal that read]: "All laws. state or national, shall operate impartially
and equally on all persons without regard to race or color." Both [proposals] were submitted to a
subcommittee of five. which included Bingham.
Dimond. Strict Construction and Judicial Reviewr oJ Racial Discrnination Under the Equal Protection Clause:
Meeting Raotd Berger on Interpretirist Grounds. 80 MICH. L. REV. 462.486 (1982) (quoting JOURNAL OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 46 (B. Kendrick ed. 1914)). Bingham proposed addi-
tional drafts, all of which referred to "all persons." and the text of the proposed amendment adopted by the
Joint Committee read: "The Congress shall have power... to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art. 4. Sec. 21: and to all persons in the several States equal
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The argument of the interpretivists that the Court acts illegitimately when
it departs from values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers suffers
from a number of deficiencies. First, the interpretivists present no historical
evidence-which they are otherwise so prone to invoke-that the framers
intended to constitutionalize values when they promulgated particular provi-
sions of the Constitution. Second, to maintain that the framers purportedly
tried to constitutionalize discrete values, the interpretivists necessarily ignore
the framers' use of broadly phrased and open-ended language in the Consti-
tution to set forth limitations on governmental power. Sometimes, as in the
equal protection clause, the interpretivists must disregard the plain language
of the text and assume that the framers meant something completely different
from what they said. The interpretivists thus relate the values allegedly con-
stitutionalized by the framers to the purpose that the framers had in promul-
gating a particular provison. 2°° From this purpose they infer values that the
framers purportedly attempted to constitutionalize. The interpretivists thus
are forced to argue that since these values must control and since they can be
identified only by inference from the framers' apparent purpose, the Court
acts illegitimately when it goes beyond these values in establishing the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision-including when it reads the constitutional
provision as written or when it looks to the very broad values implied in the
text of the provision itself. Unless the framers were incapable of saying what
they meant or of embodying their intention in the text of a constitutional
proposition, this is truly a startling position in light of the interpretivists"
claimed fidelity to the intention of the framers.
Leaving aside these apparent inconsistencies and failures of proof in the
interpretivists' position, why are so many constitutional provisions limiting
governmental power broadly phrased and open ended? The following expla-
nation may provide some guidance on whether the framers really meant what
they said and whether they were really trying to constitutionalize values when
they promulgated those provisions.
It is an important part of our constitutional tradition-related both to the
overriding principle of constitutional limitation on governmental power and to
the proposition that the Constitution is a document intended to endure2 l-
that limitations on governmental power designed to protect individual rights
are often broadly phrased and open ended. This aspect of our constitutional
protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment).- Id. at 487 (quoting JOURNAL OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 61 (B. Kendrick ed. 1914)). This wa, the text of the
Amendment that the House of Representatives considered in February 1866. After opponents objected that the
amendment should impose duties on the states directly. the amendment was reworked, and the proposal by the
Joint Committee to Congress on April 30. 1866. contained the language now embodied in § I and § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. See id. at 486-91 (1982).
200. This discussion assumes that one can properly ascertain the intention of the framers. See suipra note
56.
201. For an analysis of the relationship between the Constitution as an enduring document and noninter-
pretive review, see the discussion of Sandalow's views. suprt notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
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tradition is reflected in the Bill of Rights202 and the fourteenth amendment.
Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the framers intended to constitutionalize
discrete values when they promulgated those broad provisions. The framers
were often setting forth majestic generalities of universal application designed
to limit governmental power and to protect individual rights.
This need for broadly phrased and open-ended limitations on govern-
mental power explains why the framers' purpose in promulgating any partic-
ular constitutional provision gives little guidance on that provision's meaning.
The framers' primary concern in enacting the fourteenth amendment was
undoubtedly the protection of the newly emancipated blacks.203 But it would
not be consistent with our constitutional tradition to qualify a significant
limitation on governmental power, which the fourteenth amendment certainly
was intended to be. In our constitutional tradition limitations on governmental
power have been expressed in universal terms rather than restricted to the
protection of a particular group. So, even if the framers of the fourteenth
amendment were primarily concerned with preventing discrimination against
blacks, the fourteenth amendment, consistent with this aspect of our consti-
tutional tradition, was phrased in majestic generalities and universal pro-
tections. 20' The framers then meant what they said: all persons are entitled to
equal protection of the laws. 205 To say that the framers intended to constitu-
202. In contrast, the limitations on governmental power contained in the original Constitution for the most
part were fairly specific.
203. In this regard the Supreme Court has stated:
[Iln the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called history. but which are
familiar to us all: and on the most casual examination of the language ofthese amendments, no one can
fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of
each ... the freedom of the slave race. the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the
protection of the newly-made freedman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him.
The Slaughterhouse Cases. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36. 71 (1873).
204. Even in The Shughterhouse Cases the Court noted about the thirteenth amendment that
[wihile negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it
forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter .... [11f other rights are assailed by the states
which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply.
though the party interested may not be of African descent.
Id. at 72. Justice Powell observed in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 438 U.S. 265.293 (1977): "Although
many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast
distance between members of the Negro race and the white 'majority.* ... the Amendment itself was framed in
unisersal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude."
205. The debates preceding the adoption of the fourteenth amendment concerned the effect it would have
on existing and anticipated discriminatory practices and how the courts and Congress. in the exercise of its § 5
powers. would interpret the amendment. See generally Dimond. Strict Construction and Judicial Review of
Racial Discrimination Under the Equal Protection Clause: Meeting Raoul Berger on Interpretiist Grounds. 80
MICH. L. REV. 462.494-502 (1982). The debates do not indicate that the framers did not intend the protections
of the fourteenth amendment to be universal. When the framers wanted to limit the scope of protection to a
particular kind of discrimination. they were capable of expressing their intention accordingly. Thus. the fifteenth
amendment provides that the right to vote "'shall not be abridged on account of race. color or previous condition
of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV. § I. It does not say: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote
,,hall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State."
Because the protections of the fifteenth amendment are limited to racial discrimination, the nineteenth
amendment was necessary to prevent abridgement. on account of sex. of the right to vote. But because the
fourteenth amendment's protections are not limited in this way. the Court could rely on it to invalidate gender-
based discrimination.
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tionalize only the value of racial equality in the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause ignores not only the plain language of the text, but also the
constitutional tradition within which the framers operated. Thus, we have no
reason to say that the Court has acted illegitimately when it has defined the
equal protection clause to prohibit other forms of discrimination.
The framers of the Bill of Rights most certainly were not conveying the
kind of message that the interpretivists imply must be conveyed by any con-
stitutional provision limiting the exercise of governmental power: "We are
firmly committed to representative democracy, and the electorally account-
able branches of the government must be free to govern as they wish-except
for those specific limitations on governmental power, reflecting values that
we have constitutionalized, that are contained in the Bill of Rights." Quite to
the contrary, the Bill of Rights conveys a very different message. It reads like
a political exhortation addressed to all the branches of the federal govern-
ment-Congress, the President, and the Judiciary-containing a long list of
"Thou Shall Nots."
A number of these "Thou Shall Nots" are expressed in majestic gene-
ralities, such as the entire first amendment, the fourth amendment's search
and seizure provision, and the fifth amendment's due process clause. Others
are somewhat broadly phrased, in various levels of generality, while still
others concern particular practices in colonial times that the framers found
objectionable.2 ° More significant, perhaps, than the particular guarantees
themselves is the total effect of the Bill of Rights. It is sweeping in its pro-
hibitions, quantitatively and qualitatively, demonstrating not only that the
overriding principle of constitutional governance is the principle of limitation
on governmental power, but also that these limitations are extensive, often
broadly phrased and open ended, and overlapping in their totality. The over-
lapping nature of the provisions of the Bill of Rights makes it especially clear
that the framers did not attempt to constitutionalize discrete values into these
provisions. If that had been their intention, some of the provisions clearly
would be redundant. If, for example, the framers were trying to constitution-
alize the value of fair procedure in the fifth amendment's due process clause,
then it would not have been necessary for them to set forth in the sixth
amendment a host of more particularized procedural guarantees, such as the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,0 7 the right of
confrontation, the right of compulsory process, and the right to a speedy trial.
The framers obviously took no chances in the message they were sending.
They listed several particularized procedural guarantees, but at the same time
206. The latter category includes the third amendment's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in
private homes and the fifth amendment's requirement of grand jury indictment.
207. Fair notice and a fair opportunity to defend, for example, are required in civil cases by the due process
clause. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co.. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). A fortiori. they would be
required in criminal cases even in the absence of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
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they wanted to establish the broader principle that no person shall be deprived
of "life, liberty or property, without due process of law.-
218
After providing this lengthy list of limitations on governmental power,
the framers added the ninth amendment. Again, the message is clear: "We
tried to get it all down. But, in case we forgot anything, remember that indi-
viduals have still other rights that the government cannot violate." Thus, we
have another of the majestic generalities: "The enumeration in the Con-
stitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.
-209
Since lawyers have been accustomed to working with the Constitution as
a legal document, they might assume that the framers wanted to embody a
distinct legal meaning in all provisions of the constitution. After reading the
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, that assumption seems to be
completely unwarranted. It is much more reasonable to conclude that the
framers' primary concern was not how (or if) lawyers and judges would
fashion constitutional doctrine from the Bill of Rights. Rather, it seems that
although the Bill of Rights analytically was a legal document, its framers'
major objective was to convey a political message as strongly as they could:
"The power of the government must be limited in order to protect individual
rights. 2 1
0
Remember, also, that the sweeping limitations on governmental power
contained in the Bill of Rights were not adopted on the assumption that the
federal judiciary would define these limitations and would enforce them
208. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § I. Mott states that the phrase "due process of law" first appeared in a
statute in England in 1354: "[N]o man of what estate or condition he be. shall be put out of land or tenement, nor
taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited. nor put to death, without being brought in answer by due process of the
law." R. MOTT. DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 14. at 37 (1926) (quoting 28 Edw. II. ch. 3 (1354)). "'Due process" as
used in that statute was assumed to have the same meaning as "law of the land" in chapter 29 of the 1225 version
of the Magna Carta: "'No subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immu-
nities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty or estate, but by
the judgment of his peers of the law of the land." R. MOl. DUE PROCESS OF LAW § 28, at 77. One can argue,
however, that the phrases did not have the same meaning in English law and that "law of the land" was
significant in the development of English law while "due process" was not. See Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A
Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 279 (1975). Nevertheless,
the phrases were treated as if they had the same meaning in this country during the late 18th and early 19th
centuries: some state constitutions used the phrase "law of the land," while others used "due process of law."
So, when the framers used the phrase "due process of law" in the fifth amendment, they were hearkening back
to the Magna Carta and to the broad principles of individual freedom that it enshrined.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Ely observed that "the conclusion that the Ninth Amendment was intended
to signal the existence of federal constitutional rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution is
the only conclusion its language seems comfortably able to support." J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 38
(1980).
2 10. Since this is the message that the framers were trying to convey by the language of the Bill of Rights. it
does not matter what their motivation was in promulgating the Bill of Rights. Bork says that the Bill of Rights
was a "hastily drafted document upon which little thought was expended." Bork. Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems. 47 IND. L.J I. 22 (197 1). He relies on the research of Levy. which shows that the
Bill of Rights was drafted by the Federalists in response to objections raised to the Constitution by the
Anti-Federalists and that the Federalists. who opposed a Bill of Rights. promised to submit one only to get the
Constitution ratified. L. LEVY. LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 224-33 (1960). Regardless of the framers' motiva-
tions in promulgating the Bill of Rights. the instrument they drafted conveys a strong political message that the
poe'er of the government must be limited to protect individual rights.
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against the electorally accountable branches of the federal government. It is
debatable whether the framers contemplated judicial review, 2 " but even if
they did, they did not adopt the limitations of the Bill of Rights to enable the
judiciary to check the exercise of power by the other branches. Rather, the
framers were trying to establish the overriding principle that the power of
government must be limited to protect individual rights, and they accom-
plished their goal by imposing a host of limitations on governmental power, a
number of which were broadly phrased and open ended.
This portion of the Article has attempted to explain precisely why so
many of the constitutional limitations on governmental power designed to
protect individual rights are broadly phrased and open ended. It has shown
that the broadness of these restrictions is an important part of our constitu-
tional tradition, reflected in the Bill of Rights and at a later time in the four-
teenth amendment. Constitutional guarantees protecting individual rights are
often set forth as majestic generalities with universal application precisely
because the overriding principle of the structure of governance established by
the Constitution is that of limiting governmental power. In promulgating the
Bill of Rights the framers addressed a very strong political message to all the
branches of the federal government. The Bill of Rights was not adopted on the
assumption that the federal judiciary would define those provisions and en-
force them against the electorally accountable branches of the federal govern-
ment.
For these reasons, no basis exists for concluding that the framers in-
tended to constitutionalize discrete values when they promulgated the Bill of
Rights or when, consistent with the constitutional tradition established at that
time, they promulgated other broadly phrased and open-ended provisions of
the Constitution, such as the fourteenth amendment. What the framers were
trying to do is what they actually did in the text of the Constitution: to set
forth significant limitations on governmental power in order to protect indi-
vidual rights. Therefore, it is patently unsound to evaluate the legitimacy of
constitutional decision making by referring to values purportedly constitu-
tionalized by the framers, when it is clear that the framers did not try to
constitutionalize values at all.
D. The Legitimacy and Necessity of Noninterpretive Review
Noninterpretive review is not only legitimate, but is also a necessary
postulate for constitutional adjudication under our constitutional system.
Since many of the Constitution's limitations on governmental power are
broadly phrased and open ended, they cannot operate in contemporary soci-
ety to limit governmental power if their meaning is determined solely or even
primarily by referring to values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers
211. But if they did not. they could have had no intention regarding whether noninterpretive review was
within the authority of the federal judiciary under article 111. See PERRY. shtpra note 4. at 20-21.
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at an earlier time. In other words, even if one could say that the framers did
intend to constitutionalize discrete values, the Court does not act ille-
gitimately when it goes beyond those values to make the constitutional pro-
vision fully operable as a limitation on governmental power in contemporary
society.
The federal judiciary, of course, has the responsibility for establishing the
meaning of the provisions of the Constitution and for giving concrete expres-
sion to those broadly phrased and open-ended limitations on governmental
power contained in the Constitution."" In defining those provisions, the Court
must consider two very important points. First, the provisions must be de-
fined in a manner consistent with the overriding principle of the structure of
constitutional governance: "The power of the government must be limited in
order to protect individual rights." Second, since the Constitution is a doc-
ument intended to endure,2 13 the constitutional limitations on governmental
power must continue to restrict that power in the present as they have in the
past. For these broadly phrased and open-ended provisions to be fully oper-
able as limitations on governmental power in contemporary society, the Court
cannot be constrained, when it is defining those provisions, to values pur-
portedly constitutionalized by the framers at an earlier time. Therefore, non-
interpretive review is not only a legitimate postulate for constitutional ad-
judication under our constitutional system, but also a necessary one. '4
The bte noire of the interpretivists-the imputation of a substantive
meaning to the due process clause and the use of the due process clause to
invalidate governmental action substantively interfering with liberty and pro-
perty rights2 1 5 -illustrates this proposition. Since the starting point for consti-
tutional analysis must be the text or internal inferences of the Constitution,' 6
consider the text of the due process clause. Its terms are broad and open
ended: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law .... 7 In determining the meaning of the due process
clause, interpretivists focus on the word "process" and say that by adopting
the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments the framers
intended to constitutionalize only process values, not substantive values. 2"
Assume, arguendo, that from a historical standpoint this position is correct 219
212. See supra notes 136 & 147.
213. See supra note 201.
214. Under interpretive review, carried to its logical conclusion, the Court would not be properly perform-
ing its constitutional function. In this sense interpretive review is not legitimate because it is not consistent with
the Court's constitutional responsibility to establish the meaning of all of the provisions of the Constitution.
215. Consideration of governmental interference with those interests by means of improper procedures is
not included.
216. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
217. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similar language is contained in the fourteenth amendment.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
219. Note, however, that by the time the fourteenth amendment was enacted, at least some state courts had
ascribed a substantive meaning to the due process and law of the land clauses of the state constitutions. See E.
CORWIN. LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT 89-115 (1948). So. when the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment used the phrase "due process of law." they must have been aware that they were using a phrase that could
be interpreted to have a substantive meaning.
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and that the framers of the fifth and fourteenth amendments took those
clauses to mean that the government could not interfere with liberty and
property interests except through procedures that satisifed those principles of
fundamental fairness "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 220 In other
words, under the analysis of the interpretivists, the framers constitutionalized
the value of "procedural fairness," and only that value, when they promul-
gated the due process clause.
The framers, however, did not say, "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property except in accordance with fair procedures." They used
the more sweeping phrase "due process of law,", 22' although they presumably
understood the term to mean procedural fairness. But regardless of their
understanding when they promulgated the provision, they phrased it in a
broad and open-ended manner and, by its text, indicated a strong concern that
"life, liberty, [and] property" be protected against improper governmental
interference. The framers of the fifth amendment, 2,2 recalling the history of
interference with liberty and property rights in England and during colonial
times, apparently feared that the government would interfere again with those
rights by arbitrary and unfair procedures. They may have believed that liberty
and property interests would be adequately protected from improper govern-
mental interference if the government were required to act in accordance with
fair procedures; therefore they imposed a process limitation in the text of the
due process clause.
However, the objective of the due process clause was to limit "forever"
the power of the government to interfere with an individual's liberty and
property rights. The framers were not concerned with fair procedure for its
own sake, but only as a means to an end: namely, the protection of liberty and
property interests. Of course, they could not have contemplated the sweeping
economic and social regulation of a later era. One cannot imply that the
framers intended the due process clause to have a substantive meaning,-2
because they did not attempt to give specific meanings to the provisions they
adopted.224 But the due process clause, by its terms, contemplates protection
of liberty and property interests against improper governmental interference.
220. Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319. 325 (1937).
22 1. For a discussion of the historical meaning of that term. see supra note 208. We have no evidence, of
course, that the framers understood the meaning of *'due process* in the historical sense and no evidence at all
about their intentions regarding the meaning of the due process clause. Rather. the interpretivists assume that.
because "'due process'" was historically considered to have only a procedural meaning, the framers intended to
constitutionalize only process values into the due process clause.
222. The interpretivists assume that the intention of the framers of the fifth amendment carried over to the
framers of the fourteenth amendment. that is. that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended its due
process clause to have the same meaning as the fifth amendment's due process clause. notwithstanding that in
the interim some state courts had ascribed a substantive meaning to the corresponding clauses in the state
constitutions. See supra note 219.
223. Sandalow notes in passing: -f[l]t is true that all the decisions shaping constitutional law to contem-
porary values can also be understood as coming within the general intentions of the framers. All that is
necessary is to state those intentions at a sufficiently high level of abstractness.'" Sandalow. Consftittionttl
Interpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033. 1045 (1981).
224. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
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Later, when sweeping economic and social regulation created an apparent
threat to liberty and property interests, the due process clause remained a
textual limitation on governmental power and was properly invoked to chal-
lenge such regulation.?
The Court could have rejected a challenge of this sort and refused to
impute a substantive meaning to the term "due process of law." It could have
defined "due process" by referring to the framers' meaning when the due
process clause was promulgated. But the Court, in performing its constitu-
tional function of establishing the meaning of the Constitution, also could
have focused on the framers' objective in promulgating the due process clause
rather than on what the framers thought was necessary at that time to imple-
ment their objective. When the Court concluded that liberty and property
interests would not be protected in contemporary society by fair procedures
alone, it could properly have imputed a substantive meaning to due process
and relied on the due process clause as the textual basis for invalidating an
improper interference with liberty and property interests.226
What the Court did was to define the due process clause in a way that
made it fully operable as a limitation on governmental power in contemporary
society. The Court saw the threat to the enjoyment of liberty and property
interests arising not from procedural unfairness but from substantive enact-
ments that, in the Court's view, improperly interfered with those interests. 
227
Consequently, the Court defined the due process clause in such a way that it
would serve as a continuing limitation on governmental power and would be
225. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
226. The Court did just that in Lochner and Roe. Commentators and Justices have portrayed the Court's
decisions invalidating economic regulation in the Lochner era as demonstrations of noninterpretivism at its
worst, and the specter of Lochnerism has been invoked as an argument against the use of the due process clause
to protect personal rights. Justice Black stated in his dissent in Griswold:
The Due Process Clause with an "arbitrary and capricious" or "shocking to the conscience" formula
was liberally used by this Court to strike down economic legislation in the early decades of this
century, threatening, many people thought, the tranquility and stability of this Nation. See, e.g.,
Lochner.... That formula, based on subjective considerations of "natural justice," is no less danger-
ous when used to enforce this Court's views about personal rights than those about economic rights.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
Nonetheless, Tribe observed that in the Lochner era "the Supreme Court's views echoed a powerful strand
in the thought and politics of the early twentieth century." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 8-2, at 435 (1978). He added: "In large measure, however, it was the economic realities of the Depression that
graphically undermined Lochner's premises. No longer could it be argued with great conviction that the invisible
hand of economics was functioning simultaneously to protect individual rights and produce a social optimum."
Id. § 8-6. at 446. He concluded: "'ITlhe error of decisions like Lochner... lay not in judicial intervention to
protect 'liberty' but in a misguided understanding of what liberty actually required in the industrial age." Id.
§ Il-I. at 564 (footnote omitted). Similarly, Sandalow commented:
What values are basic to a free society, as our history demonstrates, is a question that different
generations are likely to answer differently. In the age of enterprise. "liberty of contract*" was thought
to be fundamental and. the framers having neglected to provide for it. protection for it was found in the
due process clauses. Economic freedoms are less highly prized now. and so "liberty of contract" is no
longer a vital doctrine. Substantive due process, however, despite occasional pronouncements as to its
demise, retains vitality, protecting interests that a new generation of Americans have come to see as
fundamental, interests as diverse as freedom of travel and privacy.
Sandalow. Consitittional Interpretation. 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033. 1051 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
227. See. e.g., Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (19731: Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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fully operable to protect liberty and property interests in contemporary soci-
ety. The Court's acting in this fashion is both legitimate and necessary be-
cause it enables broadly phrased and open-ended limitations on governmental
power to remain effective through time. If the Court were constrained by
values purportedly constitutionalized by the framers in the due process
clause, that clause would not continue to protect those liberty and property
interests that the framers sought to protect at a time when the threat to those
interests came from improper substantive regulation rather than from proce-
dural unfairness. To restrict the meaning and application of the due process
clause in this way would not be consistent with the overriding principle in the
governmental structure established by the Constitution: that the power of the
government must be limited to protect individual rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The different perspective on the legitimacy question that this Article has
attempted to provide leads to the conclusion that the legitimacy of noninter-
pretive review follows from the structure of constitutional governance estab-
lished by the Constitution. The overriding principle in that structure is the
concept of limitation on governmental power. This principle is reflected in a
number of broadly phrased and open-ended constitutional provisions that are
designed to limit governmental power in order to protect individual rights.
These provisions must be fully operable in contemporary society as continu-
ing limitations on governmental power. Therefore, in establishing the meaning
of these provisions in contemporary society the Court cannot be constrained
by values that the framers purportedly constitutionalized at an earlier time.2
228. Critics of broad noninterpretivist review contend that it results in judges' infusing their personal values
into the Constitution. Grano states:
[Flundamental rights without roots in the written Constitution cannot be identified without making
debatable political, normative, or moral judgments that require certain activities to be distinguished
from other, often similar activities. Because objective criteria do not exist for deciding where the lines
should be drawn, judges tend to draw them in accordance with personal preference.
Grano. sttpra note 6. at 23-34 (footnote omitted). Ely maintains that since it is impossible to discover fundamen-
tal values in any of the sources on which proponents of fundamental rights adjudication have relied, the judges
necessarily fall back on their own values in deciding what rights are fundamental and what limitations the
broadly phrased and open-ended provisions of the Constitution are to impose. See supra note 68.
However. merely because objective criteria are not available to provide a consistent basis for value infusion
(a point that Ely has demonstrated rather convincingly), it does not follow that the Court's value infusion is
nothing more than the sum total of the personal values of the individual Justices. In the first place, while it may
not be possible to discover fundamental values in any single source to provide a consistent basis in that source
for value infusion, it may be possible to identify important values by a consideration of a number of sources.
such as the 'traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479.493
(1965) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts. 291 U.S. 97. 105 (1934)). or the "teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underf!p our society." Moore v. City of East Cleveland. 431 U.S. 494. 503
(1977) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479. 501 (1965)).
More significant, when the Court makes the necessary value infusion in defining the meaning of broadly
phrased and open-ended provisions of the Constitution, such as the due process clause, it is acting, as it always
does, institutionally. The individual Justices participate in the decision making process as part of the Court's
institutional nature and function. The question for the Court collectively and for the Justices individually as they
participate in the decision making process is: What values should a particular provision embody? The values
that an individual Justice thinks the provision should embody might be quite different from the: Justice's
[Vol. 44:93
1983] THE LEGITIMACY DEBATE 137
Thus, noninterpretive review is not only legitimate, but is also a neces-
sary postulate for constitutional adjudication under our constitutional system.
Noninterpretive review is necessary to ensure that the overriding principle in
the structure of constitutional governance established by our Constitution-
that the power of the government must be limited to protect individual
rights-will have full force and effect in each succeeding generation.
personal values. An individual Justice. for example, might believe that most governmental economic regulation
is undesirable, but at the same time may take the position that the value of economic freedom should not be
embodied in the due process clause and that the due process clause should not be used to restrict significantly
the power of the government to enact economic regulation. Likewise, an individual Justice may find abortion to
be personally abhorrent, but might conclude that reproductive freedom, reflected in the decision to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy, is a very important individual right that should be free from governmental interference.
The point, then, is that different Justices may look to different sources to determine what values should be
infused into the broadly phrased and open-ended provisions of the Constitution. Although a Justice's personal
values may conceivably influence that Justice's opinion of what values should be infused into a provision, what
emerges in constitutional adjudication is an institutional decision of the Court. It is the institutional value
infusion of the Court rather than the personal values of the individual Justices that ultimately controls.

